Chapter 2

Interpretation of Statutes

Adjectives

Principle of construction—Adjectives should not be permitted to eclipse the noun—Adjectives divert away from nouns.

(Per O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.): What we have now said about the qualifying words is only to caution ourselves against adjective getting the better of the noun. Adjectives are attractive forensic aids but in matters of interpretation they are diverting intruders.

Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 239: 1983(1) SCC 147: 1983(1) SCR 1000: 1982(2) Scale 1193

Admission

Admission—Effect of—Opinion of a party about legal effect of certain facts is of no consequence in construing the provision—The admission does not operate as estoppel.

Kalidas Dhanjibhai v. State of Bombay, 1955 AIR SC 62: 1955 CrLJ 193: 1955(1) SCR 887: 57 Bom LR 702.

Ambiguous provision

In case of possibility of two constructions, the Court must adopt the Construction which will ensure smooth and harmonious working. It should eschew the construction which shall lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience.

State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, 1953 AIR SC 10: 1953 CrLJ 180: 1953 SCR 254

The construction which reduces the provision to futility, should be avoided.

Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long recognised rule of construction. Words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are therefore, not to be construed in isolation. For instance, the use of the word "may" would normally indicate that the provision was not mandatory. But in the context of a particular statute, this word may connote a legislative imperative, particularly when its construction in a permissive sense would relegate it to the unenviable position, as it were, "of an ineffectual angel beating its wings in a luminous void in vain". "If the choice is between two interpretations", "the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result."

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity, AIR 1979 SC 1029: 1979(4) SCC 85: 1979(3) SCR 472: 1979 Mad LJ (Cr.) 557

Possibility of two views—The construction in favour of validity of provision should be preferred.

The rule of construction that if the statutory provision is susceptible or admits of two reasonably possible views then the one which would promote its constitutionality should be preferred on the ground that the legislature is presumed not to have intended an excess of its own jurisdiction, is subject to the further rule that it applies only where two views are reasonably possible on the statutory language. If the words of the statute, on a proper construction, can be read only in a particular way, then it cannot be read in another way by a court of construction anxious to avoid its unconstitutionality. In a case, as here, a reference arises under 'Act', the question of the constitutionality of the 'Act' cannot be examined and pronounced upon.

Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Hashmatunnisa Begum, AIR 1989 SC 1024: 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 43: 1989(1) SCR 155: 1989(1) Scale 85: 1989(1) JT 92

Departure from ordinary rule of literal construction is permissible only if there is ambiguity in the words used, in which case the interpretation has to be made in the light of other surrounding circumstances.

(Per Bhagwati, J.): Unless there is any such ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832: 1958(1) And WR (SC) 1: 1958(1) Mad LJ (SC) 1: 1958 SCR 1

Doubtful meaning—The words must be given the construction which harmonises with the object of legislation.

The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. C. Tobit, 1958 CrLJ 809: AIR 1958 SC 414: 1958 BLJR 479: 1958 SCJ 735: 1958 SCR 1275

Effect of—Possibility of two constructions—The construction which is consistent with the smooth working of the provision, should be preferred.

If the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature.

Where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.

Collector of Customs, Baroda vs. Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., Jamnagar, AIR 1961 SC 1549: 1961 (2) CriL 720: 1962(1) SCR 896

Ambiguous provision posing possibility of two constructions. The Court shall prefer the construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice.

Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56: 1958 CrLJ 228: 1958 SCR 739: 1958(1) Andh WR (SC) 143: 1958 All WR (HC) 386: 1958 Mad LJ (Cri) 306.

A construction validating the statute should be preferred over the other interpretation but this principle cannot invalidate an otherwise valid statute.

Where a provision is capable of one of two interpretations, the interpretation which validates rather than one which may invalidate a provision applies only where two views are possible. It cannot be pushed so far as to alter the meanings of the clear words used in an enactment and to, in effect, repeal statutory provisions by making them useless without holding them to be void.

State of Punjab v. Prem Sukhdas, AIR 1977 SC 1640: 1977(2) SCC 774: 1977(3) SCR 408

Amending statute

Ambiguity in the statute can be resolved by considering the subsequent amendment clarifying the provision.

Subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous.

The legislature as a result of the amendment, clarified what was implicit in the provision as they existed earlier. An amendment which is by way of clarification of an earlier ambiguous provision can be useful aid in construing the earlier provision, even though such amendment is not given retrospective effect.

Thiru Manickam and Co. vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1977 SC 158: 1977(1) SCC 199: 1977(1) SCR 950

Analogy

Permissibility—Comparison of language of one statute with another, is though instructive but is not commendable.

The second method although sometimes instructive, is not to be commended because similarity or variation in the laws of different States is not necessarily indicative of a kindred or a changed intention. Enactments drafted by different hands, at different times and to satisfy different requirements of a local character, seldom afford tangible or sure aid in construction.

Nathia Agarwalla vs. Jahanara Begum, AIR 1967 SC 92: 1966(3) SCR 926.

Analogy—Decision on Fact—Such decisions do not operate as precedent for the purpose of subsequent cases as no two cases can be exactly similar on facts.

Decisions even of the highest court on questions which are essentially questions of fact, cannot be cited as precedents governing the decision of other cases which must rest in the ultimate analysis upon their own particular facts. The general principles governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence are well‑established and beyond doubt or controversy. The more difficult question is one of applying those principles to the facts and circumstances of a particular case coming before the Court. That question has to be determined by the Court as and when it arises with reference to the particular facts and circumstances of that individual case. It is no use, therefore, appealing to precedents in such matters. No case on facts can be on all fours with those of another.

Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1960 AIR SC 195: 1960 CrLJ 283.

In law as in life and particularly in the field of taxation law, analogies are apt to be deceptive and misleading.

Empire Jute Co. v. CIT, 1980 (3) SCR 1370: AIR 1980 SC 1946 at 53.

Casus omissus

Except in case of real necessity where literal construction leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results, supply of casus omissus is not called for.

A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Calcutta vs. National Taj Traders, AIR 1980 SC 485: 1980(1) SCC 370: 1980(2) SCR 268.

A Statute must be construed in a manner to avoid inconsistency and absurdity—A Court can even modify grammatical or ordinary sense of word to avoid absurdity and inconsistency.

It is the duty of Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what commonsense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeated the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.

Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, 1952 AIR SC 324: 1952 CrLJ 1503: 1952 SCR 683: 54 Bom LR 877.

The court must not add anything to the provision of law unless the provision in the statute book appears to be incomplete or little foolish — Plain meaning should be given to the plain words, if those are understandable and are clear in their terms.

Santosh Kumarvs. Sanjay More, 2000 (1) ACJ 422 MP.

Context

The words used in the statutes must be construed with reference to the context in which such words have occurred.

The words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning; but in many cases, judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet the ends of a fair and a reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision in which the words occur. Often enough, in interpreting a statutory provision, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words in any statutory provision, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which the provision in included, and the policy underlying the statue assume relevance and become material.

Sheikh Gulfan v. Sanat Kumar Ganguli, AIR 1965 SC 1839: 1965(2) SCJ 839: 1965(3) SCR 364.

Clarificatory statute

Where the clarificatory power is used to explain the obvious and something which in incapable of being misconstrued, the clarification is either a meaning surplusage or fraught with the risk of being stigmatised as a colourable exercise of power.

Virendra Bhupatrai Mehta vs. State of Maharahstra, 1991(3) Bom CR 636.

Court fee

The benefit of doubt arising out of interpretation must be extended to the litigants.

The Court must give the benefit of doubt against levy of a price to enter the temple of justice until one day the whole issue of the validity of profit-making through sale of civil justice, disguised as court-fee, is fully reviewed by the Court.

State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi, AIR 1979 SC 855: 1979(2) SCC 236: 1979(3) SCR 184: 81 Puri LR 472.

Definition clause in a statute

The object of a definition section is to provide legislative dictionary for appreciating the true meaning of a word or expression used in the statute. However, All definition sections normally open with words "unless the context otherwise requires" or a similar expression. Although, therefore, the meaning to be ordinarily given to a word or expression used in the statute is that which is given in the definition section, this requirement is not inflexible. There may be provisions in the statute where such meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject of context in which the word or expression has been used and the object sought to be achieved.

Ravindra Wasudeo Jamdagni v. Mah. Academy of Engineering of Educational Research, Pune, 1992 (II) Bom CR 50.

Trade commodity—The words and expression must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade.

In determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article or commodity the turnover of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well-settled it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted.

Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 SC 1552: 1980(4) SCC 71: 1980(3) SCR 1109: 1980 WLN 476

Where the definition clause uses the expression 'includes', it is not exhaustive.

A definition is expected to be exhaustive. Its very terms may, however, show that it is not meant to be exhaustive. For example, a purported definition may say that the terms sought to be defined "includes" what it specifies, but, in that case, the definition itself is not complete.

State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra, AIR 1976 SC 800: 1976(1) SCC 834: 1976(3) SCR 168

Principle of interpretation of undefined words.

The words not defined should be given a meaning in consonance with the purposes of statute. It is not correct to give as wide a meaning as possible to terms used in a statute simply because the statute does not define an expression. The current rule is that we have to endeavour to find out the exact sense in which the words have been used in a particular context. We are entitled to look at the statute as a whole and give an interpretation in consonance with the purposes of the statute and what logically follows from the terms used.

Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Officer-in-charge (Court of Wards), Paigah, AIR 1977 SC 113: 1976(3) SCC 864: 1977(1) SCR 146.

Directive principles and preamble

The Directive Principles and Preamble to Constitution are guide to interpretation. The Court must ensure purposive interpretation to promote the march towards a socialist democratic State.

Whether it is the Constitution that is expounded or the constitutional validity of a statute that is considered, a cardinal rule is to look to the Preamble to the Constitution as the guiding light and to the Directive Principles of State Policy as the Book of Interpretation. The Preamble embodies and expresses the hopes and aspirations of the people. The Directive Principles set out proximate goals. When we go about the task of examining statutes against the Constitution, it is through these glasses that we must look, 'distant vision' or 'near vision'. The Constitution being suigeneris, where constitutionl issues are under consideration, narrow interpretative rules which may have relevance when legislative enactments are interpreted may be misplaced.

Whatever article of the Constitution it is that we seek to interpret, whatever statute it is whose constitutional validity is sought to be questioned, we must strive to give such an interpretation as will promote the march and progress towards a Socialistic Democratic State. For example, when we consider the question whether a statute offends Atticle 14 of the Constitution we must also consider whether a classification that the legislature may have made is consistent with the socialist goals set out in the Preamble and the Directive Principles enumerated in Part IV of the Constitution. A classification whcih is not in tune with the Constitution is per unreasonable and cannot be permitted.

Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana, AIR 1986 SC 859: 1986(2) SCC 249: 1986(1) SCR 399: 1986(1) Scale 260: 1986 Pun LJ 191.

Where a legislation was clearly in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution; in interpreting such a piece of legislation the Courts cannot adopt a doctrinaire or pedantic approach.

It is a well-known rule of construction that in dealing with such a beneficent piece of legislation, the Courts ought to adopt a construction which would sub serve and carry out the propose and object of the Act rather than defeat it.

National Textile Corpn. Ltd v. Sita Ram Mills Ltd, 1986 (2) SCR 187: 1986 SCC 117: AIR 1986 SC 1234: 1987 (61) Comp Case 373: 1986 (2) CompLJ 261: 1986 (1) Scale 657.

Directory or mandatory

Duty of Court is to ascertain the real intention of the Legislature. There is no universal rule that mandatory enactment shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience.

H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, 1955 AIR SC 196: 1955 CrLJ 526: 1955(1) SCR 1150: 57 Pun LR 235: 1955(1) Mad LJ 173.

The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory is a question which has to be adjudged in the light of the intention of the Legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute. If the statute is mandatory, the thing done not in the manner of form prescribed can have no effect or validity; if it is directory, penalty may be incurred for non-compliance, but the act or thing done is regarded as good.

Sheth Mohan Lal Ganpat Ram vs. Sayaji Jubilee Cotton & Jute Mills Co., 1964(1) CompLJ 326 Guj.

No general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non‑observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only directory, i.e., a direction the non‑observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the court has to decide the legislative intent.

To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same.

Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, 1961 AIR SC 849: 1961(2) CrLJ 12: 1962(1) SCR 33: 1961 BLJR 589

Directory or mandatory—Determination of—Use of word 'may' in appropriate case means 'shall' if the context so requires—The provision cannot be held mandatory if the same is not necessary for the working of the Act.

Kali Pada Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1963(1) CrLJ 88: 1963 AIR (SC) 134: 1963 (2) SCR 904: 1963 BLJR 8.

The rules which are vital and go to the root of matter are mandatory but other rules are only directory. The court must determine the nature of Statute on the broad principles of common-sense.

The tendency towards technicality should be deprecated. It is the substance that counts and must take precedence over mere form. Some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter they cannot be broken; others are only directory and a breach of them can be over-looked provided there is substantial compliance with the rules read as whole an provided no prejudice ensues; and when the legislature does not itself state which is which judges must determine the matter and, exercising a nice discrimination, sort out one class from the other along broad based, commonsense lines.

Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta, AIR 1956 SC 140: 1956 SCJ 143: 1955(2) SCR 1029.

Use of words "shall" and "may" is not per se conclusive even though generally the use of word "shall" is taken in a mandatory sense.

The use of the word "shall" in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid.

On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word "may" has been used, the statute is only permissive or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid.

The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other. . . . . .'

State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912: 1957 All LJ 921: 1958 Mad LJ: 1958 SCJ 150: 1958 SCR 533.

No general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only director, i.e., a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the Court has to decide the legislative intent.

To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same.

Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 849: 1961 BLJR 589: 1962(1) SCR 33.

Use of expression 'shall' does not always mean that enactment is obligatory of mandatory—It depends upon the context in which the word occurs and other circumstances.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., 1967 CrLJ 285: AIR 1967 SC 276: 1966 Supp SCR 473: 1967 MPLJ 14: 1967 Jab LJ 153.

Use of expression "shall"—Conviction of master of foreign vessel violating maritime zone of India—The Court is bound to confiscate the vessel as well and has no discretion in the matter.

Chern Taong Shang. v. Commander, S.D. Baijal, 1988 CrLJ 855: 1988 AIR (SC) 603: 1988 SCC (Cr) 162: 1988 Cr LR (SC) 150: 1988(1) Crimes 524: 1988(90) Bom LR 56.

Necessity of laying of order passed under the statute before the Parliament – Where the provision not indicating if the Parliament may modify the order, such provision is directory and not mandatory.

It does not provide that it shall be subject to the negative or the affirmative resolution by either House of Parliament. It also does not provide that it shall be open to the Parliament to approve or disapprove the order made under Section 3 of the Act. It does not even say that it shall be subject to any modification which either House of Parliament may in its wisdom think it necessary to provide. It does not even specify the period for which the order is to be laid before both House of Parliament nor does it provide any penalty for non-observance of or non-compliance with the direction as to the laying of the order before both House of Parliament. It would also be noticed that the requirement as to the laying of the order before both Houses of Parliament is not a condition precedent but subsequent to the making of the order. In other words, there is no prohibition to the making of the orders without the approval of both Houses of Parliament.

Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1149: 1979(2) SCC 196: 1979(1) SCR 1070.

In appropriate case the 'may' can be interpreted as 'shall' which has to be determined on the basis of the subject and the context of the Statute.

There is no doubt that the word "may" generally does not mean "must" or "shall". But it is well-settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context. It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. Sometimes, the Legislature uses the word "may" out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1618: 1963 All LJ 617: 1963(2) Lab LJ 444: 1964(2) SCR 197.

Plainly, "shall" must normally be construed to mean "shall" and not "may", for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one who intends to leave a lee‑way will use the language of command in the performance of an act. But since, even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words.

The governing factor is the meaning and intend of the legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that the legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed as peremptory. One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature.

Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee, 1975 CrLJ 1993: AIR 1976 SC 263: 1975 CrLR (SC) 526: 1976 CAR 38: 1975 (2) SCC 482.

Use of negative and prohibitory words—The provision is indicative of being mandatory.

The purpose for which the provision has been made, its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the general inconvenience or injustice which may result to the person from reading the provision dealing with the same subject and the language of the provision are all to be considered. Prohibition and negative words can rarely be directory. It has been aptly stated that there is one way to obey the command and that is completely to refrain from doing the forbidden act. Therefore, negative, prohibitory and exclusive words are indicative of the legislative words are indicative of the legislative intent when the statute is mandatory.

Mannalal Khetan etc. etc. vs. Kedar Nath Khetan and others, etc. AIR 1977 SC 536: 1977(2) SCC 424: 1977(2) SCR 190.

An over-riding clause which started with negative or prohibitive words is rarely, if ever be directory and is therefore mandatory of negative command.

Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam, AIR 2011 SC 2321.

The word "may" is also capable of meaning must or shall.

The word 'may' is capable of meaning 'must' or 'shall' in the light of the context and that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command.

Shri Rangaswami, The Textile Commissioner v. Sagar Textile Mills (P) Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 1516: 1977(2) SCC 578: 1977(2) SCR 825.

It is necessary to gather legislative intent before determining if the provision is directory or mandatory.

The determination of the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law maker. And that has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it in one way or the other. We see no reason why the rule should receive a permissible interpretation instead of a peremptory construction.

State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190: 1976(2) SCC 895: 1976(1) SCR 369.

Use of word 'shall' or 'may' by itself is not conclusive.

The governing factor is the meaning and intent of the legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that the legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible the statute ought to be construed as peremptory. One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature.

Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel v. Agriculture Produce Market Committee, AIR 1976 SC 263: 1975 (2) SCC 482: 1976 (1) SCR 451.

Consideration of public interest while construing the provision is necessary.

There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important. The weighing of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and, more often than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or directory. Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat that design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non‑compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidate the act complained of. It is well to remember that quite often many rules, though couched in language which appears to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefit. The negligence of those to whom public duties are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute. It is as well to realise that every prescription of a period within which an act must be done, is not the prescription of a period of limitation, with painful consequences if the act is not done within that period.

Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation Bhopal, 1983 CrLJ 448: 1983 AIR (SC) 303: 1982 CrLR (SC) 297: 1982 CAR 197: 1984 SCC (Cr) 311: 1982 Ker LT 594: 1982 All WC 546.

Drafting

Draughtmanship—Clumsy drafting causing obscurity—Such interpretation should be avoided.

The clumsy draftmanship displayed in a statute which affects the common man in his daily bread, is deplorable. It is unfortunate that easy comprehensibility and simplicity for the laity are discarded sometimes through over‑sophisticated scholarship in the art of drawing up legislative bills. It cannot be overstressed that a new orientation for drafting methodology adopting directness of language and avoiding involved reference and obscurity is overdue.

Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra, 1976 CrLJ 1527: AIR 1976 SC 1929: 1976 CrLR (SC) 348: 1976 SCC (Cr) 493.

Apparent conflict due to bad drafting has to be resolved by adopting a purposive construction so as to avoid apparent contradiction. Accordingly a Letter patent appeal to division bench against an order of Single Judge of High Court passed in appeal against an interlocutory order shall be barred by law.

Moh. Saud v. Sheikh Mahfooz, AIR 2011 SC 485.

Effect of grammar

Grammar is a good guide to meaning but bad master to dictate. Necessity to use practical wisdom while interpreting grammatical construction.

(Per V.R. Krishana Iyer): The law is not 'a brooding omnipotence in the sky' but a pragmatic instrument of social order. It is an operational art controlling economic life, and interpretative effort must be imbued with the statutory purpose. No doubt, grammer is a good guide to meaning but a bad master to dictate.

Carew and Company Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260: 1975(2) SCC 791: 1976 (1) SCR 379.

Explanation

An explanation must be understood on the basis of its plain language and not with any pre-defined notion about its scope.

(Per P.N. Bhagwati, J.): This contention, which seeks to treat the Explanation as illustrative in character is clearly fallacious. It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention. It must be remembered that the legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain language and not on any a priori considerations.

Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 915: 1977(2) SCC 548: 1977 (2) SCR 790.

If on a true reading of an explanation it appears that it has widened the scope of the main section, effect must be given to legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the legislature named the provision as an Explanation.

Janki Barik v. Executive Engineer, Central Electrical Division, Balasore, 1999 (1) ACJ 155.

External aid

Where the terms of Statute are clear and unambiguous, resort to English Law for its interpretation is not called for.

If the terms are plain and unambiguous we cannot have resort to the position in law as it obtained in England or in other countries when the statute was enacted by the Legislature. Such recourse would be permissible only if there was any latent or patent ambiguity and the Courts were required to find out what was the true intendment of the Legislature. Where, however, the terms of the statute do not admit of any such ambiguity, it is the clear duty of the Courts to construe the plain terms of the statute and give them their legal effect.

Sales Tax Officer, Banaras v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf, AIR 1959 SC 135: (1959) Mad LJ (SC) 35: 1959 SCR 1350.

Parliamentary exposition revealed in the subsequent statute can be considered and it is not impermissible.

Sometimes light may be thrown upon the meaning of an Act by taking into consideration 'parliamentary expositions' as revealed by the later Act which amends the earlier one to clear up any doubt or ambiguity. This principle has to be followed where, as in the instant case, a particular construction of the earlier Act will render the later incorporated Act ineffectual or otiose or inept.

Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. The General Mining Syndicate Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 2520: 1976 (3) SCC 852: 1977 (1) SCR 359

Parliamentary debate though it may be misleading, there is no bar against use of speech given in Parliament to ascertain object of a statute.

It is true that it is dangerous and may be misleading to gather the meaning of the words used in an enactment merely from what was said by any speaker in the course of a debate in Parliament on the subject. Such a speech cannot be used to defeat or detract from a meaning which clearly emerges from a consideration of the enacting words actually used.

Interpretation of a statutory provision is always a question of law on which the reasons stated by the mover of the amendment can only be used as an aid in interpretation if we think, as I do in the instant case, that it helps us considerably in understanding the meaning of the amended law. We find no bar against such a use of the speech.

Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, AIR 1976 SC 10: 1976(1) SCC 254: 1976(1) SCR 461: 1976 UPTC 177.

External aid—Reference to dictionaries—Permissibility.

Standard dictionaries as a rule give in respect of each word as many meanings in which the word has either been used or it is likely to be used in different contexts and connections. While it may be permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the meaning in which a word is capable of being used or understood in common palance, the well‑known canon of construction should not even for a minute be overlooked that the meaning of the words and expressions used in a statute ordinarily take their colour from the context in which they appear.

R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, 1984 CrLJ 613: AIR 1984 SC 684: 1984 CrLR (SC) 163: 1984 SCC (Cr) 172: 1984(1) Crimes 568: 1984 CAR 141.

Subsequent legislation—Consideration of—Permissibility.

It is a well‑recognised principle in dealing with matters of construction that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see what is the proper interpretation to be put upon the earlier Act where the earlier Act is obscure or ambiguous or readily capable of more than one interpretation.

State of Bihar v. S.K. Roy, 1966 CrLJ 1538: AIR 1966 SC 1995: 1966 Supp SCR 259: 1966 BLJR 873.

Fiscal statute

Construction of exemption clause. Liberal and strict construction, both have to be invoked at different stages of interpretation.

An exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment state revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principle requires it to be construed strictly. Truly, speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and is calls for a wider and liberal construction.

Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd, AIR 1991 SC 2049: 1990 (4) SCC 256: 1990 (2) SCR 659: 1990 Supp (1) Scale 61: 1991(1) JT 151.

Provision prescribing machinery for computation of tax—Principle of strict construction has no application.

The true implication of the principle that a taxing statute must be construed strictly is often misunderstood and the principle is unjustifiably extended beyond the legitimate field of its operation.

The rule of construction on which the assessee relied applied only to a taxing provision and had no application to all provisions in a taxing statute. The Court observed that the rule did not apply to a provision not creating the charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or procedure for its collection:

"We are concerned in this case to determine not whether a particular turnover can be brought to sales-tax but whether if the turnover was liable to be charged to sales-tax, the firm can be assessed to tax after its dissolution. In other words, we are concerned with a provision which prescribes the machinery for the computation of tax and not with a charging provision of the Sales Tax Acts."

Murarilal Mahabir Prasad v. Shri B.R. Vad, AIR 1976 SC 313: 1975 (2) SCC 736: 1976 (1) SCR 689.

In case of statute imposing tax, there is no question of any intendment. In case of doubt construction in favour of assessee should be adopted.

In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.

To this may be added a rider: in a case of reasonable doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Patiala v. Shahzada Nand and Sons, AIR 1966 SC 1342: 1966 (1) SCJ 715: 1966 (3) SCR 379.

A notification entitling exemption from levy in a fiscal statute has to be read literally to arrive at strict interpretation.

Uttam Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, AIR 2011 SC 1520.

Harmonious construction

It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its power invalid. If the narrow and technical concept of sale is discarded and it be assumed that the Legislature sought to use the expression sale in a wider sense as including transactions in which property was transferred for consideration from one person to another without any previous contract of sale, it would be attributing to the Legislature an intention to enact legislation beyond its competence. In interpreting a statue the Court cannot ignore its aim and object.

New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1207: 1963 BLJR 746: 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 459.

Illustration

Scope and effect of an illustration.

An illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates but equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit; and if knowledge of certain facts is as much available to the prosecution, should it choose to exercise due diligence, as to the accused, the facts cannot be said to be "especially" within the knowledge of the accused.

This is a section which must be considered in a commonsense way; and the balance of convenience and the disproportion of the labour that would be involved in finding out and proving certain facts balanced against the triviality of the issue at stake and the ease with which the accused could prove them, are all matters that must be taken into consideration. The section cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that, save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.

Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, 1956 AIR SC 404: 1956 CrLJ 794: 1956 SCR 199: 1956 All WR (Supp) 79: 1956 Nag LJ 464: 1956(2) Mad LJ (SC) 1

Jurisprudence not relevent

While construing a statute, it is not advisable for court to venture into jurisprudence.

It is the part of judicial prudence to decide an issue arising under a specific statute by confining the focus to that statutory compass as far as possible. Diffusion into wider jurisprudential areas is fraught with unwitting conflict or confusion.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 687: 1977(2) SCC 77: 1977(2) SCR 149.

Land reforms law

In respect of land reform laws, the court should promote policy of equitable ownership of agricultural land.

The key thought that pervades our approach is that if the constitutionally envisioned socio-economic revolution is not to be a paper tiger, agrarian laws have to be meaningfully enacted, interpreted and executed and the Court is not the anti-hero in the drama of limping land reform.

The agrarian policy is equitable ownership and the reform philosophy is redistributive justice the rural goal being small peasant proprietorship.

A legislation which has provided for ignoring decrees diminishing surplus lands and has otherwise prevented the escape of excess area by voluntary transfers cannot conceivably be intended to permit inherited excesses.

A processual facility cannot be converted into an opportunity to pervert and to thwart the substantive object of the law. After all Courts faced with special case situations have 'creatively' to interpret legislation. The Courts are 'finishers, refiners and polishers of legislation which comes to them in a state requiring varying degrees of further processing', said Donaldson, J., in Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc. 1968 (3) WLR 714 and indeed it is no secret that Courts constantly give their own shape to enactments (Says Harry Bloom in an article on 'Interpretation of Statutes' (1970) Vol. 33 Mod Law Rev. pp. 197, 201).

State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952: 1975 Pun LJ 388: 1975(2) SCC 310: 1976(1) SCR 626.

Legal fiction

The court is entitled and bound to ascertain the purpose for which the statutory fiction is created to ascertain as to what persons are entitled to the benefit of statutory fiction.

When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion.

State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak, 1953 AIR SC 244: 1953 CrLJ 1094: 1953 SCR 773.

Legal remedy

Liberal interpretation—A statute providing remedy should not be interpreted strictly if two constructions are possible.

(Per Krishna Iyer, J.): If the language used in a statute can be construed widely so as to salvage the remedial intendment, the Court must adopt it. Of course, if the language of the statute does not admit of the construction sought, wishful thinking is no substitute. In my view, minor definitions disability, divorced from the realities of industrial economics, if stressed as the sole touchstone, is sure to prove disastrous when we handle special types of legislation.

Carew and Company Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260: 1975(2) SC 791: 1976 (1) SCR 379.

Legislation by reference & incorporation

Statute incorporating provision of an earlier statute. Amendment in earlier statute does not affect incorporated provision.

Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:

(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each others,

(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;

(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1835: 1975(1) All LR 470: 1976 (1) SCR 6: 1975(2) SCC 377.

Reference by incorporation—Effect and scope of.

It is a well accepted Legislative practice to incorporate by reference, if the Legislature so chooses, the provisions of some other Act in so far as they are relevant for the purposes of and in furtherance of the scheme and objects of that Act.

Legislature can not be attributed the intention to obliterate one provision by another provision of the same Act. On the other hand, it should be construed as furthering the object of the Act.

Aggarwal Trading Corporation v. Assistant Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1972 SC 648: 1972 (1) SCJ 534: 1972 (3) SCR 85.

Legislative intent

Determination of legislative intent— Necessity to follow literal construction— Circumstances to resort to find intention of legislature for the purpose of construction.

The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provisions the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. The first question to be posed is whether there is any ambiguity in the language used. If there is none, it would mean the language used, speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning. If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed.

Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India, 1983 CrLJ 647:AIR 1982 SC 1413: 1982 CrLR (SC) 523: 1983 CAR 137: 1982 SCC (Cr) 642.

The cardinal law on interpretation is that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with a clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible.

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathi Devi, 1996 ACJ 1520 Mad.

Legislative intent— Reference to— It is only when the words are not clear enough to give natural meaning that the Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of Legislature in construing the provision.

In construing the provisions of a statute, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a whole and taking into consideration other matters and the circumstances which led to the enactment of the statute.

Where the language of a statute was free from ambiguity a duty was cast upon the Court to do anything more than to give effect to the words used.

S.A. Venkataraman v. State, 1958 AIR SC 107: 1958 CrLJ 254: 1958 SCR 1040: 1958 All WR (HC) 602: 1958(2) Mad LJ (SC) 45

Legislative policy if should be ignored—Necessity to effectuate the object of statute.

It is unexceptional that the Courts are not concerned with the policy of the legislature or with the result, whether injurious or otherwise, by giving effect to the language used nor is it the function of the Court where the meaning is clear not to give effect to it merely because it would lead to hardship. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that one of the duties imposed on the Courts in interpreting a particular provision of law, rule or notification is to ascertain the meaning and intendment of the legislature or of the delegate, which in exercise of the powers conferred on it, has made the rule or notification in question. In doing so, we must always presume that the impugned provision was designed to effectuate a particular object or to meet a particular requirement and not that it was intended to negative that which it sought to achieve.

Firm Amar Nath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand, AIR 1972 SC 1548: 1972(1) SCC 893: 1972 (3) SCR 922.

To ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.

A contract of sale becomes a sale under the Sale of Goods Act only when the property in the goods is transferred to the buyer under the terms of the contract itself.

Poppatlal Shah, Partner of Messrs. Indo Malayan Trading Co. v. State of Madras, represented by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Sowcarpet, Madras, 1953 AIR SC 274: 1953 CrLJ 1105: 1953 SCR 677.

Legislative intent—Object of legislation—Construction advancing the object under lying the Act should be preferred.

The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the Court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an abbiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self‑defeating. The Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the Statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief when the Statute was enacted and to remove which the Legislature enacted the Statute. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the Court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act namely, to make effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it.

R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, 1984 CrLJ 613: AIR 1984 SC 684: 1984 CrLR (SC) 163: 1984 SCC (Cr) 172: 1984(1) Crimes 568: 1984 CAR 141

Liberal construction

Corruption—Wrongful loss to Government by benefiting third person—The provision should be liberally interpreted to give affect to socially beneficial object of prevention of corruption.

The long title as well as the preamble indicate that the Act was passed to put down the said social evil, i.e., bribery and corruption by public servant. Bribery is a form of corruption. The fact that in addition to the word "bribery" the word "corruption" is used shows that the legislation was intended to combat also other evil in addition to bribery.

The Act also creates a new offence of criminal misconduct by public servants though to some extent it overlaps on the pre‑existing offences and enacts a rebuttable presumption contrary to the well known principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. It also aims to protect honest public servants from harassment by prescribing that the investigation against them could be made only by police officials of particular status and by making the sanction of the Government or other appropriate officer a precondition for their prosecution. As it is a socially useful measure conceived in public interest, it should be liberally construed so as to bring about the desired object, i.e., to prevent corruption among public servants and to prevent harassment of the honest among them.

M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1963(2) CrLJ 186: AIR 1963 SC 1116: 1963 Supp (2) SCR 724: 1963 Ker LT 1015: 1963 Mad LJ (Cri) 581.

Provision affecting right to avail legal remedy—Application of principle of liberal interpretation if necessary.

Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved." Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality.

Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar, AIR 1975 SC 2092: 1975(2) SCC 702: 1976 (1) SCR 306.

It is not always possible to be guided by the meaning of the words as found in the dictionary while resorting to interpret the actual meaning of a word found in an agreement between the parties. In our opinion, while construing the meaning of a particular word found in an agreement between the parties the intention of the parties to the document in question will have to be given necessary weightage and it is not possible to give a wider and liberal meaning merely because one of the parties to the said agreement is a public authority.

Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raj Kumar Rajagrahia, 1999 (3) SCC 465.

Literal construction

Duty to give effect to natural meaning to words used in the provision.

In construing the provisions of a statute, it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough. It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a whole and taking into consideration other matters and the circumstances which led to the enactment of the statute.

Electrical Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. D.D. Bhargava, 1968 CrLJ 236: AIR 1968 SC 247: 1968 (1) SCR 394: 1968 Mad LJ (Cri) 109.

The 'Lakshman Rekha' has in fact been extended to move away from the strictly literal rule of interpretation back to the rule of the old English case of Heydon, where the Court must have recourse to the purpose, object, text, and context of a particular provision before arriving at a judicial result.

Eera Through Dr. Manjula vs State, decided on 21 July, 2017 by Supreme Court.

Permissibility—Necessity to give affect legislative intent—Where literal construction lead to absurdity, resort to same is not permissible.

The dominant purpose in constructing statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. The first question to be posed is whether there is any ambiguity in the language used in Rule 40. If there is none, it would mean the language used, speaks the mind of Parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning. If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be restored to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed.

Captain Dharam Pal Kukrety v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413: 1982(3) SCC 140: 1983(1) SCR 393: 1982(1) Scale 676.

Logical construction

A construction which would lead to absurdity and should be avoided.

The dictum that law is not always logic. But the court should be very slow to give a construction to a section, which would lead to absurdity and will cause injustice. It is unacceptable the contention that a short notice served on a member will invalidate a meeting altogether but non-receipt of the notice by a member will not have the same effect.

Calcutta Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Dhiresh Chandra Roy, 1985(58) Comp Case 275: 1984(3) CompLJ 305 Cal (DB).

Use of common sense

Law may not all be common sense and logic may not be the life of law but common sense is not taboo in law courts.

Zaffar Mohammad v. State of West Bengal, 1976 CrLJ 190: AIR 1976 SC 171: 1976 SCC (Cr) 46: 1976 CrLr (SC) 44: 1975 CAR 435: 1976 All CrC 126

Manifest contradiction

In case of likely inconvenience, absurdity, hardship or injustice, the Court may put a construction which may even modify meaning of the word.

Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.

Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 830: 1956 Nag LJ 53: 1955 SCJ 787: 1955(2) SCR 457.

Marginal note

A marginal note cannot affect a substantive provision of the statute.

Marginal notes to the sections of a statute and the titles of its chapters cannot take away the effect of the provisions contained in the Act so as to render those provisions legislatively incompetent, if they are otherwise within the competence of the legislature to enact. One must principally have regard to the object of an Act in order to find out whether the exercise of the legislative power is purposive, unless, of course, the provisions of the Act show that the avowed or intended object is a mere pretence for covering a veiled transgression committed by the legislature upon its own powers. Whether a particular object can be successfully achieved by an Act, is largely a matter of legislative policy.

Tara Prasad Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1682: 1980(4) SCC 179: 1980(3) SCR 1042.

Non obstante clause

A non-obstante clause is to be given a restrictive meaning to ensure harmonious interpretation of the provisions of the Act.

Geeta v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 414.

Scope of non obstante clause— Confidentiality of document— The Statute barring production of records in evidence notwithstanding the Evidence Act, 1872—Production of documents by resort to provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 is not permissible.

Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bombay v. Laxmichand Narayandas, AIR 1962 SC 1121: 1962(2) CrLJ 254.

An over-riding clause which started with negative or prohibitive words is rarely, if ever be directory and is therefore mandatory of negative command.

Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam, AIR 2011 SC 2321.

Meaningless interpretation

An interpretation rendering a provision meaningless or misleading, should be avoided.

(Per B.D. Gupta, J. for himself and S.N. Katju, J.): Provisions parallel to those contained in section 147 of the Companies Act are to be found in sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Companies Act (6 of 1882) which was in force at the time the General Clauses Act, 1897 was brought on the statute book. Though the question which has arisen for consideration by us relates to the meaning to be assigned to the expression 'person' in rule 10 of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the contention of learned Counsel for the appellants amounts, in substance, to this that, by reason of the provisions contained in section 147 of the Companies Act, it must be held that the expression 'person' whenever and wherever used in any statute, must be construed as excluding a limited company from the purview of that expression. Keeping in view the fact that provisions parallel to those contained in section 147 of the Companies Act, formed part of the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, which was in force at the time the General Clauses Act was brought on the statute book, the acceptance of this contention would result in attributing to the Legislature, which enacted the General Clauses Act, an intention which cannot be attributed on any principle of interpretation, because the definition of the expression 'person' in clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, in so far as an incorporated company has been specifically included in that definition, would, if the interpretation contended for was accepted, he rendered not only meaningless and redundant but manifestly misleading. It is, therefore, impossible to accept the contention that an incorporated company, which has been specifically included in the definition of the expression 'person' in the General Clauses Act, must, nevertheless be construed as excluded from the purview of the expression 'person' in rule 10 of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even though there is nothing in the subject or context of the Code of Civil Procedure, to make out any repugnancy.

There is nothing in rule 10 or elsewhere to indicate that the provisions contained in rule 10 did not apply to cases where the identity of the real party was known to the plaintiff. The object of framing rule 10 may have been to protect the unwary, but there is nothing in rule 10 which might indicate that in case the plaintiff knew the real person the provisions contained in rule 10 would be inapplicable. Rule 10 can be availed of whenever a person factually carried on business under a name or style other than his (or its) own name and the provision bring a beneficent one cannot be construed strictly and in a manner not warranted by the language of the statute.

(Per Satish Chandra, J.): Section 147 of the Companies Act, 1956, relates to the publication of name by the company. Sub-section (2) provides that if a company does not paint or affix its name and the address of its registered office, or keep the name painted or affixed in the manner directed by clause (a) of sub-section (1), the company, and every officer of the company, who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees for not so painting or affixing its name and the address of its registered office. Sub-section (3) provides that if a company fails to comply with clause (a) or clause (b) or sub-section (1) the company shall be punishable with fine, which may extend to five hundred rupees. Sub-section (4) provides for punishments of fine for default mentioned in it and also provides that every officer of a company who commits the mentioned defaults shall further be personally liable to the holder of the bill of exchange, hundi, etc. cheque or order for money or goods unless it is duly paid by the company. The object of this provision is to compel the publication of its name to the business world, which deals with the company. The provisions nowhere states that the company must carry on business only in its registered name or that it cannot use any other name howsoever valuable or useful the goodwill of any other name or style may be. This provision would be completely satisfied in a case where a company carries on business in an assumed name or style if it publishes or affixes its name in the sign-boards, seal, business letters, notices, official publications, bills of exchange etc. etc. mentioned in sub-section (1). This provision, therefore, does not prohibit a company from carrying on business in an assumed name. It compels it to publish its identity in all its business dealings in the manner provided for in this section. If the provisions of section 147 are complied with, it could not be said that the company was concealing its identity in its dealings even though it was carrying it on in an assumed name or style.

Rajendra Prasad Oil Mills vs. Chunni Devi, 1969(39) Comp Case 193: 1968(2) CompLJ 137 All (FB)

Objects and reasons

Objects and reasons give an insight into the background why a particular legislation has been made and thought the objects and reasons cannot be the ultimate guide in the interpretation of statutes, but it is an aid to the court in finding out reason as to why legislature enacted the particular law or provision of the law, as it clearly spells out the intention of the legislature. As the legislatures are entrusted with the task of making laws, so while interpreting the same, the courts should not take rigid stand, more particularly in respect of a progressive social welfare legislation. It should make an attempt to make the object of the legislation effective and render its benefits to the persons in whose favour it is made. The courts should not attempt a construction, which defeats the very intention of the legislature and deprives the have-nots of the benefits of the legislation.

Sadh Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1996 ACJ 880 HP.

In interpreting the Act, the judge should be cognizant to and always keep at the back of his/her mind the constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisons of the Act in the light thus shed

State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, 1993 CrLJ 1029: AIR 1993 SC 1126: 1993 CrLR (SC) 72: 1992 (3) Crimes 1104.

It is not permissible to refer to the statement of objects and reasons except for the purpose of ascertaining the situation prevailing at the time of presentation of bill.

(Per Bhagwati, J.): Though it is not legitimate to refer to the statement of objects and reasons as an aid to the construction or for ascertaining the meaning of any particular word used in the Act or Statute.

Except for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of evil which he sought to remedy.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, AIR 1957 SC 832: 1958 (1) Andh WR (SC) 1: 1958(1) Mad LJ (SC) 1: 1958 SCR 1.

Obscurity of language

Statute must be provided in a manner so as it may be understood by citizens who are required to abide by the same.

To liquidate obscurity in legislative language, by abandoning obsolescent vocabulary and style of expression is an overdue measure.

The rule of law is the cornerstone of democracy and how can there be a rule of law society if the members, the bulk of whom are too poor to buy legal services, cannot decode the legislator'slaw and therefore obey it? Incomprehensible law annoys the Administration and estranges the citizen at a time when quick justice and less sterile litigation are the desiderata. The command of the law can claim the allegiance of the lay only by simplicity in legislation.

Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2279: 1975(2) SCC 472: 1976(1) SCR 400

Pari materia

In case of similar statutes, the meaning of expression should be same where both the statutes deal with criminal branch of law.

State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61: 1958 CrLJ 232: 1958 SCR 580: 1958 Mad LJ (Cri) 299: 1958(1) An WR (SC) 136.

Penal statute

Words of penal statute should be strictly constructed— Benefit of doubt should go in favour of accused.

The statute creating an offence and impossing a penalty of fine and imprisonment, the words of the section must be strictly construed in favour of the subject. We are not concerned so much with what might possibly have been intended as with what has been actually said in and by the language employed.

W.H. King v. Republic of India, 1952 AIR SC 156: 1952 CrLJ 836: 1952 SCR 418: 54 BomLR 435

No ambiguity in penal statute— The principle that benefit of doubt should go in favour of citizen has no application where the meaning of statute is clear.

Ranchhoddas Atmaram v. Union of India, 1961 AIR SC 935: 1961(2) CrLJ 31: 1961(3) SCR 718: 1961 Mad LJ (Cri) 620: 1961(2) Andh WR (SC) 120.

Strict construction—A penal Statute has to be construed strictly but where no ambiguity exist, the Court cannot add words to make the provision less stringent.

This additional mode is by proving the extent of the pecuniary resources or property in the possession of the accused or any other person on his behalf and thereafter showing that this is disproportionate to his known sources of income and that the accused person cannot satisfactorily account for such possession. If these facts are proved the section makes it obligatory on the Courts to presume that the accused person is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty, unless the contrary, i.e., that he was not so guilty is proved by the accused. The section goes on to say that the conviction for an offence of criminal miscouduct shall not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such presumption.

Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1964(1) CrLJ 310: 1964 AIR (SC) 464: 1964 (4) SCR 630: 1964 Cur LJ (SC) 37

Strict construction—Possibility of two constructions—The construction consistent with good sense and fairness should be preferred.

A penal provision must be strictly construed; that is to say, in the absence of clear compelling language, the provision should not be given a wider interpretation, and "no case should be held to fall within which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute."

If two constructions are possible upon the language of the statute, the Court must choose the one which is consistent with good sense and fairness, and eschew the other which makes its operation unduly oppressive, unjust or unreasonable, or which would lead to strange, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an element of bewildering uncertainty and practical inconvenience in the working of the statute.

Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1976 CrLJ 184: AIR 1976 SC 133: 1976 (1) SCC 560: 1975 CrLR (SC) 624: 1976 CAR 18.

Strict construction—Scope of—Effect of clear legislative intent to the contrary.

When it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly it only means that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words. To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. It has also been held that in construing a penal statute it is a cardinal principle that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principles of interpretation namely, that the primary test is the language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and plain the court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature.

M.V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi, 1961 AIR SC 1494: 1961(2) CrLJ 696: 1961 All LJ 656: 1961 BLJR 680: 64 Bom LR 158

Strict construction—The temporary provision infringing upon the rights of individual to enjoy municipal amenities—It should be strictly construed.

There are provisions of an exceptional character, meant to be in force for a specified period during which the Legislature thought it advisable and expedient to provide for such extraordinary remedies. Such remedies which are inroads upon the landlord's freedom of action, have to be construed strictly in accordance with the words actually used by the Legislature, and they cannot be given an extended meaning.

Kanaiyalal Chandulal Monim v. Indumati T. Potdar, AIR 1958 SC 444: 1958 CrLJ 814: 1958 SCR 1394: 60 Bom LR 929.

Interpretation of a penal provision of law must be hyper-technical.

A benefit under section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be attracted only on the circumstances specifically spelt out in that provision of law, subject to the riders as added thereto in the proviso enumerated as (a), (b), (c). The benefit provided under section 138 is, therefore, a special benefit which can be attracted only on strict compliance of those requirements as specifically spelt out in the said provision of law at the point of penalty provied therein. Apart from the benefit provided in this provision of law the honest holder in appropriate case may have recourse to the other provisions of law under Indian Penal Code or Civil Laws, but in order to attract the benefit of this section he must proceed in the hyper-technical way as provided in this provision of law.

United Credit Ltd. vs. Agro Sales India, 1999 DCR 119.

Even though Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a penal statute, it is the duty of the Court to interpret it consistent with the legislative intent and purpose so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. As stated above Section 138 of the Act has created a contractual breach as an offence and the legislative purpose is to promote efficacy of banking and of ensuring that in commercial or contractual transactions cheques are not dishonoured and credibility in transacting business through cheques is maintained. The above interpretation would be in accordance with the principle of interpretation quoted above "brush away the cobweb varnish, and who the transactions in their true light" (Wilmot C.J.) or (by Maxwell) "to carry out effectively the breach of the statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, to an indirect or circuitous manner that it has prohibited". Hence, when the cheque is returned by a bank with an endosement account closed, it would amount to returning the cheque unpaid because "the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque" as envisaged in Section 138 of the Act.

Nepc Micon Ltd. & Ors. vs. Magma Leasing Ltd., 1999 DCR 16.

The construction of Penal Code 1860 must be based on ordinary rule of interpretation and cannot be restricted on notions prevailing at the time of enactment of the Code.

That construction must be based on the meaning of the words used, to be gathered according to the ordinary rules of interpretation and in consonance with the generally accepted principles of exercise of criminal jurisdiction.

It is not necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the Indian Penal Code at the present day in accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible, unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the contrary.

Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, 1957 AIR SC 857: 1957 CrLJ 1346: 1958 SCR 328: 1958 All WR (HC) 112: 1958 Mad LJ (Cri) 42: 61 Bom LR 58

Duty of Court—A construction which will not cause honest, unconcerned and unwary man to be trapped, should be preferred.

Here is an Order which is to affect the business of hundreds of persons, many of whom are small petty merchants and traders, the sort of men who would not have lawyers constantly at their elbow; and even if they did, the more learned their advisers were in the law the more puzzled they would be as to what advice to give, for it is not till one is learned in the law that subtleties of thought and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain English words which any ordinary man of average intelligence, not versed in the law, would have no difficulty in understanding. In a penal statute of this kind, it is our duty, to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they will not become traps for honest, unlearned (in the law) and unwary men. If there is honest and substantial compliance with an array of puzzling directions, that should be enough even if on some hypercritical view of the law other ingenious meanings can be devised.

Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 278: 1953 CrLJ 1116: 1953 SCR 825: 56 Bom LR 1

Penal statute – Strict interpretation likely to result in culprit escaping punishment – Options for the court.

"…….the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within the definition of 'dowry' punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, "demand of dowry" as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the 'demand' made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a 'demand' of dowry during marriage negotiations and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride's house find that the bride or her parents or relatives have not met the earlier 'demand' and call off the marriage and leave the bride's house, should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic 'no'. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes…..."

S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of A.P., (1996) 4 SCC 596; See also Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 961.

Even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given effect to. The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the subject- matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law. Criminal jurisprudence does not say so.

Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 628; See also Eera Through Dr. Manjula vs State, decided on 21 July, 2017 by Supreme Court..

Pith and substance

It is the primary duty of the court to ascertain the intention of legislature from the words used in the Statute and carry out that intention even if such construction may be less consistent with the object and policy of the Statute.

The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.

The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defend or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction.

It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief the defect which the Act purports to remedy and correct.

Kanti Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907: 1958 SCJ 99 1958 SCR 360

Legislative competence—The doctrine of pith and substance assume that a legislation is within the competence of the legislature and save incidental encroachment if the law in pith and substance, is within the legislative field.

(Per Das, J.): The doctrine of pith and substance postulates, for its application, that the impugned law is substantially within the legislative competence of the particular Legislature that made it, but only incidentally encroached upon the legislative field of another Legislature. The doctrine saves this incidental encroachment if only the law is in pith and substance within the legislative field of the particular Legislature which made it. Therefore, if the Provincial Legislature under entry 1 had power to vest general jurisdiction on a newly constituted Court, then if the law made by it incidentally gave jurisdiction to the Court with respect to matters specified in List I the question of the applicability of the doctrine of pith and substance might have arisen.

State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, AIR 1951 SC 69: 53 Bom. LR 402: 1951 SCJ 103: 1951 SCR 51.

Determination of legislative competence—The legislative entries in the Constitution must be examined by keeping in view the principle of pith or substance.

The legislatures in our Country possess plenary powers of legislation. This is so even after the division of legislative powers, subject to this that the supremacy of the legislatures is confined to the topics mentioned as Entries in the List conferring respectively powers on them. These Entries, it has been ruled on many an occasion, though meant to be mutually exclusive are though meant to be mutually exclusive are sometimes not really so. They occasionally overlap, and are to be regarded as enumeratio simplex of broad categories. Where in an organic instrument such enumerated powers of legislation exist and there is a conflict between rival Lists, it is necessary to examine the impugned legislation in its pith and substance, and only if that pith and substance falls substantially within an Entry or Entries conferring legislative power, is the legislation valid, a slight transgression upon a rival List, notwithstanding.

The power to legislate on a topic of legislation carries with it the power to legislate on an ancillary matter which can be said to be reasonably included in the power given.

State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, 1959 AIR SC 544: 1959 CrLJ 660: 1959 Supp (1) SCR 904: 1959 Mad LJ (Cri) 309

Plain meaning

The Court may even depart from the normal rule of giving plain meaning to prevent injustice or absurdity.

The primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to so interpret The statute as to promote/advance the object and purpose of the enactment. for this purpose, where necessary the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the Court would be well justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing the written word if necessary.

Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur, AIR 1986 SC 1499: 1986(2) SCC 237: 1986(1) SCR 383: 1986(1) Scale 272: 1986(30) DLT 68.

Preamble

Preamble assists in ascertaining intention of the Legislature but it does not affect clear words used in the statute.

A preamble is a key to open the mind of the legislature but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and unambiguous language of the enactment. It is only when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision that recourse may be had to the preamble to ascertain the reasons for the enactment and hence the intention of the Parliament. If the language of the enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that one is to be preferred which comes nearest to the purpose and scope of the preamble. In other words, Preamble may assist in ascertaining the meaning but it does not affect clear words in a statute. The courts are thus not expected to start with the preamble for construing a statutory provision nor does the mere fact that a clear and unambiguous statutory provision goes beyond the preamble give rise by itself to a doubt on its meaning.

Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 540: 1970 (2) SCJ 387: 1970(2) SCR 732: 1969(3) SCC 99.

Effect of express provision in the Statute—Where language is unambiguous, resort to preamble for interpretation is not called for.

Where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply. Court cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though it would be justified in restoring to it, nay, it will be required to do, if it finds that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limited application.

Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 954: 1961(2) SCA 523: 1962(1) SCR 44.

Presumption of validity of a statute

The legislature must not be presumed to give ridiculous meaning to a common word—The interpretation must be made against harsh or ridiculous effect of legislation.

Where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute was not the one intended by the law-makers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the Legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent.

Budhan Singh v. Babi Bux, AIR 1970 SC 1880: 1970 All LJ 903: 1970(2) SCR 10: 1969(2) SCC 481.

Procedural provision

Interpretation of code of procedure must be elastic to meet the ends of justice. It must further the opportunity of being heard subject to the exception of clear language of the statute.

A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure', something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to 'both' sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.

There must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and when they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonable possible, in the light of that principle.

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425: 69 Mad LW 1: 1955 SCJ 431: 1955 (2) SCR 1.

All procedural laws are intended to achieve the ends of justice and to make fair adjudication between the parties. As per well accepted principles of law, procedural law must be interpreted liberally to achieve the object of the Act and no procedure should be framed to operate so as to result in throttling of basic principles of civil jurisprudence.

Amrit Lal Sood v. Kaushalya Devi Thapar, 1998 ACJ 531.

Progressive construction

The court must be conscious of constitutional mandates in favour of human rights while interpreting the statutes.

Constitutional deference to the Legislature and the democratic assumption that people's representatives express the wisdom of the community lead courts into interpretation of statutes which preserves and sustains the validity of the provision. That is to say, courts must, with intelligent imagination, inform themselves of the values of the Constitution and, with functional flexibility, explore the meaning of meanings to adopt that construction which humanely constitutionalizes the statute in question.

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675: 1978(4) SCC 494: 1979(1) SCR 392.

Prospective or retrospective

Principle of determination of interpretation against retrospectivity has no application where language of the statute is clear.

The rule that a statute is not to have retrospective operation is only applicable where it is doubtful from the language used whether or not, it was intended to have such operation. Where the language of a statute plainly gives it a retrospective operation, the rule has no application, for, "Of course, it is obviously competent for the Legislature, if it pleases, in its wisdom to make the provisions of an Act of Parliament retrospective.

Gulab Chand v. Kudilal, AIR 1958 SC 554: 1958 Jab LJ 485: 1958 MPLJ 632: 1959 SCJ 173: 1959 SCR 313.

No provision in a statute should be given retrospective effect unless the legislature by express terms or by necessary implication has made it retrospective and that where a provision is made retrospective, care should be taken not to extend its retrospective effect beyond what was intended.

Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 703: 1969 Pun LR 11: 1970 (1) SCJ 537: 1969(2) SCR 347.

Amendment of procedural law operates retrospectively and is applicable to pending proceedings.

No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. A change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right which is only prospective.

Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915: 1958 (2) Mad LJ (SC) 207: 1958 SCJ 1231: 1959 SCR 919.

Implication of being retrospective—Express provision rendering a statute retrospective is not necessary.

A retrospective operation is, not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated restrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute is not properly called a restrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time anticedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectively may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed.

Mithelesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247: 1989 MPLJ 156: 1989(2) SCC 95: 1989 (1) SCR 621: 1989 (1) Scale 358: 1989 (1) JT 275.

Distinction in application of statutes dealing with substantive rights and procedural statutes.

(Per S.C. Agrawal, J.): A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the Legislature. A statute is regarded as retrospective if it operates on cases or facts coming into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past conduct. By virtue of the presumption against retrospective applicability of laws dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relations of the law, whether relating to form or to substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degree even of provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings.

K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1012: 1994(5) SCC 593: 1994(4) Scale 192: 1994 (6) JT 182: 1994(2) Rent LR 373.

Absence of express provision—Necessity in Statutes affecting vesting rights of the parties.

While provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment.

That provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality Orders which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided.

Dafedar Niranjan Singh v. Custodian, Evacuee Property (Pb), AIR 1961 SC 1425: 1962(1) SCR 214.

Determination and enforcement of retrospective legislation.

(Per S.K. Das, J.): A statute which is not declaratory of a pre-existing law nor a matter relating to procedure but affects vested rights cannot be given a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary, and even in construing a section which is to a certain extent retrospective, the line is reached at which the words of the section cease to be plain. These are well settled principles, and there is no reason to doubt their accuracy.

(PerM. Hidayatullah, J.): The date on which the amendment comes into force is the date of the commencement of the amendment. It is read as amended from that date. Under ordinary circumstances, an Act does not have retrospective operation on substantial rights which have become fixed before the date of the commencement of the Act. But this rule is not unalterable. The Legislature may affect substantial rights by enacting laws which are expressly retrospective or by using language which has that necessary result. And this language may give an enactment more retrospectivity than what the commencement clause gives to any of its provisions. When this happens the provisions thus made retrospective, expressly or by necessary intendment, operate from a date earlier than the date of commencement and affect rights which, but for such operation, would have continued undisturbed.

Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co., Ltd. v. S.G. Mehta, Income-tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1436: 1963(1) SCJ 491: 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 92.

Change of forum to seek remedy in law—In the absence of express provision to the contrary, the change shall be effective retrospectively and shall also apply to all matters in which cause of action accrued prior to creation of forum.

The change in law was merely a change of forum, i.e., a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective.

New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237: 1975(2) SCC 840: 1976(2) SCR 266: 1976 ACJ 128

Procedural statute—Statute not effecting the vested rights shall operate retrospectively.

A statute has to be looked into for the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied. In that connection the former state of the law is to be considered and also the legislative changes contemplated by the statute. Words not requiring retrospective operation so as to affect an existing statutory provisions prejudicially ought not be so construed. It is a well-recognised rule that statute should be interpreted if possible so as to respect vested rights. Where the effect would be to alter a transaction already entered into, where it would be to make that valid which was previously invalid, to make an instrument which had no effect at all, and from enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action.

If the Legislature forms a new procedure alterations in the form of procedure are retrospective unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be. In other words, if a statute deals merely with the procedure in an action, and does not affect the rights of the parties it will be held to apply prima facie to all actions, pending as well as future.

K. Eapen Chako v. Provident Investment Company (P) Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 2610: 1977(1) SCR 1026: 1977(1) SCC 593.

Scope of retrospectivity—Principle of not giving retrospective powers without express provision—Application of.

(Per R.S. Sarkaria, J.): In construing a statute or "a section in a statute which is to a certain extent retrospective, we ought nevertheless to bear in mind the maxim (that is, except in special cases, the new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights) as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant.

Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069: 1974 (1) SCC 567: 1974 (2) SCR 655.

Amendment of definition clause

In the absence of any express provision or indication of intention by necessary intendment that the definition should be so construed as to take away existing rights, it should be so interpreted that it would not operate prior to the Act came into force and partitions which had taken effect earlier than the Act have to be accepted and given effect to; otherwise, the consequences would be serious and far-reaching; for instance, a man of the age of sixty who had chosen to remain a bachelor, and had separated from the family four scores of years back, would be brought into the fold of 'family' and land held by him would be put into the hotchpotch for determining the ceiling in the hands of his father or mother who may be living. Such a position could not have been contemplated by the legislature. Therefore it was held that the legislative intent behind Orissa Land Reform Act seems to be that partition beyond 26th of Sept, 1970, would not be acted upon and it would not affect earlier partitions.

Bhubaneswar Prasad Singh Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 Orissa 159: (1983) 55 Cut LT 233.

Law granting compensation or damages is a substantive law which can not be retrospective.

(Per A.K. Mathur, CJ & Dipak Mishra, J.): There is no gainsaying that awarding of the compensation cannot be said to be a procedural law. It is a substantive law — The substantive part of the criminal law deals, not with crimes alone, but with punishments also. So in the civil law, the rules as to the measure of damages pertain to the substantive law, no less than those declaring what damage is actionable — Thus, grant of damages is a matter of substantive law and unless the legislature has intended to give it retrospective effect, the provisions cannot be interpreted, be it a social measure.

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Heera, 2000 (2) ACJ 963 Raj

Proviso

The provision with proviso must be interpreted widely by applying broad rules of construction—The court should construe the proviso so as to avoid repugnancy with the main provision.

The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest.

The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail.

The Court should not so construe the proviso as to attribute an intention to the legislature to give with one hand and taken away with another. To put it in other words, a sincere attempt should be made to reconcile the enacting clause and the proviso and to avoid repugnancy between the two.

Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012: 1959 CrLJ 1231: 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875: 1959 MLJ (Cri) 759: 1959 (2) Andh WR (SC) 201.

A proviso is subject to main provision and is not an independent enactment.

A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context.'

To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction.

Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, AIR 1975 SC 1758: 1975(1) All LR 516: 1976(1) SCC 128: 1976(1) SCR 277.

Though a proviso is in the nature of an excepting clause but on appropriate occasions it can be treated as substantive clause itself.

The proper function of a proviso is to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the proviso would be within that clause. It may ordinarily be presumed in construing a proviso that it was intended that the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. But the question is one of interpretation of the proviso: and there is no rule that the proviso must always be restricted to the ambit of the main enactment. Occasionally in a statute a proviso is unrelated to the subject-matter of the preceding section, or contains matter extraneous to that section, and it may have then to be interpreted as a substantive provision, dealing independently with the matter specified therein, and not as qualifying the main or the preceding section.

Ishveralal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibhai Nagibhai, AIR 1966 SC 459: 68 Bom LR 645: 1966 Mah LJ 1049: 1966(1) SCR 367.

Function and purpose of—Principles of construction.

A proviso may have three separate functions. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment.

While interpreting a proviso care must be taken that it is used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them separately.

A proviso is intended to limit the enacted provision so as to except something which would have otherwise been within or in some measure to modify the enacting clause. Sometimes a proviso may be embedded in the main provision and becomes an integral part of it so as to amount to a substantive provision itself. A proviso may serve four different purposes:

(1) Qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment.

(2) It may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable:

(3) It may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and

(4) It may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.

S. Sundaram Pillai, etc. v. V. R. Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582: 1985(1) SCC 591: 1985(1) Scale 74: 1985 (2) SCR 643: 1985 MPRCJ 127.

Proviso is in the nature of exception of main provision. It cannot nullify the main provision.

It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment not can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment rarely says nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect.

Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, AIR 1991 SC 1538: 1991(3) SCC 442: 1991(2) SCR 802: 1991(1) Scale 958: 1991(2) JT 604.

Proviso may function as independent provision also.

(Per V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.): It is absolutely plain that in the context, setting and purpose of a provision, even a proviso may function as an independent clause.

Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 915: 977(2) SCC 548: 1977(2) SCR 790.

Proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as proviso— Proviso must be construed harmoniously with the substantive provision.

Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1957 SC 281: 1957 CrLJ 404: 1957 SCR 51: 1957(1) Mad LJ (Cri) 83

Punctuation

Punctuation is minor element and should be given weight in a carefully punctuated statute but it cannot control the plain meaning of the text.

(Per Mukhreja, J.): Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts. When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. That punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of a text.

Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369: 1953 SCJ 38: 1953 SCR 1.

Purposive construction

It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The Courts must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary.

S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 CrLJ 3237: AIR 1996 SC 2184: 1996 SCC (Cr) 792: 1996(3) Crimes 35 (SC).

Possibility of two constructions—The construction which would render the provision ultra vires, should be avoided.

If two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would make it intra vires and the other ultra vires, the Court must lean to that construction which would make the operation of the section intra vires. The reason is that no intention can be imputed to the Legislature that it would exceed its own jurisdiction. It is a well established rule that a statute has to be so read so as to make it valid; it has to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pareat.

Johri Mal v. The Director of Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1568: 69 Pun LR 824: 1967 (3) SCR 286

The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of construction.

This change was not initiated by the teleological approach of European Community jurisprudence, and the influence of European legal culture generally, but it has been accelerated by European ideas: see, however, a classic early statement of the purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) LR 2 AC 743 atp. 763 (HL). In any event, nowadays the shift towards purposive interpretation is not in doubt. The qualification is that the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the context, e.g. social welfare legislation and tax statutes may have to be approached somewhat differently.

Regina (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health, [2003] UKHL 13 : [2003] 2 AC 687 : [2003] 2 WLR 692 (HL)

If the purpose of a particular provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the Act which in this case is, to counteract, the effect of the transfer of assets so far as computation of income of the assessee is concerned then bearing that purpose in mind, we should find out the intention from the language used by the Legislature and if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result i.e. result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found out in the manner indicated before, and if another construction is possible apart from strict literal construction then that consturction should be preferred to the strict literal construction. Though equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be made that these do not remain always so and if a construction results in equity rather than in in-justice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction.

Commissioner Of Income Tax vs Sri J.H. Gotla, AIR 1985 SC 1698, 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 711.

By way of introduction to the issue of statutory construction I should say that in my judgment it is nowadays misleading — and perhaps it always was — to seek to draw a rigid distinction between literal and purposive approaches to the interpretation of Acts of Parliament. The difference between purposive and literal construction is in truth one of degree only. On received doctrine we spend our professional lives construing legislation purposively, inasmuch as we are enjoined at every turn to ascertain the intention of Parliament. The real distinction lies in the balance to be struck, in the particular case, between the literal meaning of the words on the one hand and the context and purpose of the measure in which they appear on the other. Frequently there will be no opposition between the two, and then no difficulty arises. Where there is a potential clash, the conventional English approach has been to give at least very great and often decisive weight to the literal meaning of the enacting words.

Oliver Ashworth Ltd. V. Ballard Ltd., [1999] 2 All ER 791.

Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.' The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of construction. This change was not initiated by the teleological approach of European Community jurisprudence, and the influence of European legal culture generally, but it has been accelerated by European ideas.

R. (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health, [2003] 2 All E.R.113 referred with approval in See Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen - 2017 (2) SCC 629 at Para 37.

An interpretation which is likely to render a part of Statute meaningless must be avoided.

In construing the provisions of a statute courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective; an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.

Where the literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative.

Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf U.P., AIR 1959 SC 198: 1959 All LJ 83: 1959 SCR 1287.

Purposive interpretation—The provision if constructed literally, likely to be rendered unconstitutional—The construction which meets the test of constitutionality should be preferred.

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR SC 955: 1962(2) CrLJ 103: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: 1962 BLJR 636: 1963(1) MLJ (SC) 40

Absurdity and injustice etc. is presumed to be not intended by the Legislature.

If a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co., 1967 CrLJ 285: AIR 1967 SC 276: 1966 Supp SCR 473: 1967 MPLJ 14: 1967 Jab LJ 153

Purposive interpretation—The golden rule of construction is that there are no golden rules.

Lack of legislative simplicity has led to interpretative complexity. The home truth that legislation is for the people and must, therefore, be plain enough has hardly been realised by our law‑makers. Judges, looking at statutes are forced to play a linguistic game guessing at the general legislative purpose and straining at semantics. In the present case we have had to reach the conclusion against the appellants by broadening the dimensions of Heyden's Case, importing a 'context‑purpose' teleological approach. There are many canons of statutory construction, but the golden rule is that there are no golden rules.

Chitan J. Vaswani v. State of West Bengal, 1976 CrLJ 1: 1975 AIR (SC) 2473: 1975 SCC (Cr) 765: 1975 CAR 427

Principles of purposive interpretation.

The fundamental rule of interpretation is the same whether one construes the provisions of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, namely, that the court will have to find out the expressed intention from the words of the Constitution or the Act, as the case may be. But, if, however, two constructions are possible then the Court must adopt that which will ensure smooth and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well established provisions of existing law nugatory.

Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1987: 1966 All CJ 778: 1967(1) SCR 77.

Repugnancy

Determination of—Principles of interpretation to determine repugnancy.

1. That in order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.

2. That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.

3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.

4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statute continue to operate in the same field.

M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, 1979 CrLJ 773: AIR 1979 SC 898: 1979(3) SCC 431: 1979 CrLR (SC) 219.

Conflict in Statutes—General and special law—Effect of.

A particular enactment is not repealed by a general enactment in the same Statute.

Poppatlal Shah, Partner of Messrs. Indo Malayan Trading Co. v. State of Madras, represented by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Sowcarpet, Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274: 1953 CrLJ 1105: 1953 SCR 677.

Rent Control Legislation

Benefit of doubt belongs to the tenant for whose benefit the legislation is enacted.

It is too platitudinous to preach and too entrenched to shake, the proposition that rent control legislation in a country of terrible accommodation shortage is a beneficial measure whose construction must be liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purpose and not frustrate it. So construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to the potential evictee unless the language is plain and provides for eviction. That intendment must, by interpretation, be effectuated. This is the essence of rent control jurisprudence.

Mani Subrat Jain vs. Raja Ram Vohra, AIR 1980 SC 299: 1980(1) SCC 1: 1980(2) SCR 141: ILR 1980 (HP) 27.

Repeal

Re-enactment of Statute— The Court has to ascertain as to whether the intention of legislature is to destroy the rights and liabilities created under the earlier Statute to conclude if the provision of earlier Statutes have met the consequences provided under the provision.

The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifest an intention to destroy them.

The proposition that Section 6, General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation, is too broad to be followed. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law.

Therefore where, as in this case, the repealing section which purports to indicate the effect of the repeal on previous matters, provides for the operation of the previous law in part and in negative terms, as also for the operation of the new law in the other part and in positive terms, the said provision may well be taken to be self-contained and indicative of the intention of Section 6, General Clauses Act.

Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 77: 1956 SLJ 171: 1955(2) SCR 1117.

Distinction with amendment—The amendment is a wider term—As a matter of reality there is no distinction between repeal and amendment.

It is a matter of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending law, that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision substituted. Such deletion has the effect of repeal of the existing provision. Such a law may also provide for the introduction of a new provision. There is no real distinction between 'repeal' and an 'amendment'.

Amendment is in fact, a wider term and it includes abrogation or deletion of a provision in an existing statute. If the amendment of an existing law is small, the Act professes to amend; if it is extensive, it repeals a law andre-enacts it. An amendment of substantive laid down or by necessary implication inferred.

Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 740: 1988 Supp. SCC 30: 1988(1) SCR 1034: 1987(2) Scale 1097: 1987(4) JT 476.

Inference of implied repeal—Consideration for.

Where a statute provides in express terms that its enactment will repeal an earlier Act by reason of its inconsistency with such earlier Act, the latter may be treated as repealed. Even where the later Act does not contain such express words, if the coexistence of the two sets of provisions is destructive of the object with which the later Act was passed, the Court would treat the earlier provision as impliedly repealed. A later Act which confers a new right would repeal an earlier right if the fact of the two rights co-existing together produces inconvenience, for, in such a case it is legitimate to infer that the legislature did not intend such a consequence. If the two Acts are general enactments and the later of the two is couched in negative terms, the inference would be that the earlier one was impliedly repealed. Even if the later statute is in affirmative terms it is often found to involve that negative which makes it fatal to the earlier enactment.

Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581: 69 PunLR 781: 1967 (2) SCWR 707: 1967(3) SCR 399.

Repeal by implication—Considerations for determination of.

Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication, the Court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together and the repeal of the express prior enactment must flow from necessary implication of the language of the later enactment. It is therefore necessary in this connection to scrutinise the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the two enactments.

T.S. Baliah vs. T.S. Rangachari, Income Tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Madras, AIR 1969 SC 701: 1969 Mad LJ (Cri) 547: 1969(3) SCR 65

Implied repeal by special provision— Two provisions mutually irreconcilable— The general provision stands impliedly repealed.

The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions. Courts in applying this doctrine are supposed merely to give effect to the legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provisions may by itself, and without more, lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter. In such a case the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously. Section 80 is a special provision. It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject-matters.

Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 104: 1989(3) SCR 440: 1989(2) Scale 28: 1989 (3) JT 148: 1989(3) SCC 537.

Repeal of special law by a later general law cannot be lightly inferred.

A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words, "where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. In such cases it is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act.

Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur vs. Thakur Manmohan Dey and others, AIR 1966 SC 1931: 1966 BLJR 997: 1966(3) SCR 663.

General and special law—Conflict in Statutes—Effect of—A particular enactment is not repealed by a general enactment in the same Statute.

Poppatlal Shah, Partner of Messrs. Indo Malayan Trading Co. v. State of Madras, represented by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Sowcarpet, Madras, 1953 AIR SC 274: 1953 CrLJ 1105: 1953 SCR 677

Rules of procedures

The rules cannot be permitted to become mistress of justice—Rules should remain a hand maid of justice.

Rule of procedure are not by themselves an end but the means to achieve the ends of justice. rules of procedure are tools forged to achieve justice and are not hurdles to obstruct the pathway to justice. Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents its miscarriage by enabling the Court to do justice in myriad situations, all of which cannot be envisaged, acting within the limits of the permissible construction, must be preferred to that which is rigid and negatives the cause of justice. Thee reason is obvious. Procedure is meant to subserve and not rule the cause of justice. When the outcome and fairness of the procedure adopted is not doubted and the essentials of the prescribed procedure have been followed there is no reason to discard the result simply because certain details which have not prejudicially affected the result have been inadvertently omitted in a particular case. In our view, this appears to be the pragmatic approach which needs to be adopted while construing a purely procedural provision. Otherwise, rules of procedure will become the mistress instead of remaining the handmaid of justice, contrary to the role attributed to it in our legal system.

Owner and Parties interested in M.V. 'Vali Pero' v. Fernandeo Lopez, AIR 1989 SC 2206: 1989(4) SCC 671: 1989 Supp. (1) SCR 187: 1989(2) Scale 642: 1989(4) JT 100.

Schedule to statute

Schedule is a part of statute itself— It is only in case of conflict that the statute prevails upon the schedule.

A Schedule in an Act of Parliament is a mere question of drafting. It is the legislative intent that is material. An Explanation to the Schedule amounts to an Explanation in the Act itself.

To simplify the presentation of statutes, it is the practice for their subject matter to be divided, where appropriate, between sections and schedules, the former setting out matters of principle, and introducing the latter, and the latter containing all matters of detail. This is purely a matter of arrangement, and a schedule is as much a part of the statute, and as much an enactment, as is the section by which it is introduced. The schedule may be used in construing provisions in the body of the Act. It is as much an act of Legislature as the Act itself and it must be read together with the Act for all purposes of construction. Expressions in the Schedule cannot control or prevail against the express enactment and in case of any inconsistency between the schedule and the enactment the enactment is to prevail and if any part of the schedule cannot be made to correspond it must yield to the Act.

However, the basic principle is that in case of a conflict between the body of the Act and the Schedule the former prevails.

Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1989 SC 2227: 1989(4) SCC 378: 1989 Supp. (1) SCR 129: 1989 (2) Scale 617: 1989(3) JT 720.

Similar provisions

Difference in the language of similar provisions— The inference which can be drawn is that both the provisions were enacted with different intentions.

When the two sections in the same Act relating to the same subject-matter have been drafted in different language, it is not unreasonable to infer that they were enacted with a different intention and that in one case the intention was to give finality to all decisions of the taxing officer or the taxing judge, as the case may be, while in the other case it was only intended to give finality to questions of fact that are decided by a Court but not to questions of law. Whether a case falls under one particular section of the Act or another is a pure question of law.

Nemi Chand v. Edward Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 28: 1952 SCJ 674: 1953 SCR 197.

Similar words

A word used in one part of the statute should normally be assigned same meaning in the other part of the statute unless there exist sufficient reason to assign a different meaning.

The presumption, that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight, and it is proper if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another part of an Act. But the presumption is not of much weight. The same word may be used in different senses in the same statute, and even in the same section.

Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, AIR 1957 SC 23: 1957 All LJ 33: 1957 BLJR: 59 Bom LR 83: 1956 SCR 644

Social construction

Need to bring change by interpretation to serve the social order is necessary.

Public law in our piebald economy and pluralist society responds to societal challenges and Constitutional changes. To miss the ideological thrust of our Constitution and the economic orientation of our nation while construing legislation relating to public law and scanning them for their validity is to fail in understanding the social philosophy that puts life and meaning into the provisions of the Act. The law, being realistic, reckons with the socialist sector covering State and cooperative enterprises.

To classify what is conceptually and operationally different into a separate category is intelligence, not impertinence. The judicial art of interpretation and appraisal is imbued with creativity and realism, especially where fundamental changes have been wrought by the Constitution in our approach to public sector enterprises. Legal Darwinism adapting the rule of law to new societal developments, so as to survive and serve the social order is necessary.

D.R. Venkatachalam etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and others etc., AIR 1977 SC 842: 1977(2) SCC 273: 1977(2) SCR 392.

Sovereign immunity

The question whether the Government is bound by a particular statement has to be determined on the basis of the provision of statute itself by determining legislative intent in this regard and the purpose of statute.

The rule is merely one of construction which raises an intial presumption in its favour, not any hard and fast rule. It is a rule intended to give effect to the intentions of the legislature and consequently if there is either in the purpose of the Act or in its provisions a manilestation of a clear intention to the contrary, the presumption would be rebutted and the State would be bound.

The test for determining whether the Government is bound by a statute is whether it is expressly named in the provision which it is contended binds it, or whether it "is manifest that from the terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the legislature that it shall be bound", and that the intention to bind would be clearly made out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would be wholly frustrated unless the Government were bound.

State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd, AIR 1964 SC 669: 1964(2) SCA 451: 1964(5) SCR 387.

Special statute

The principle of general statute cannot be applied to special statute to supply an omission as may be found by the court.

If the legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. "To do so"—"would be entrenching upon the preserves of Legislature", the primary function of a court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare.

These provisions of the Limitation Act which the legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Sales Tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it". "The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land and demand perfect obedience".

If the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.

Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow v. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, AIR 1975 SC 1039: 1975(4) SCC 22: 1975(3) SCR 743.

Statement of objects

Statement of object is not part of history of legislation, even though such history may be relevant— Scope of consideration of Statement of Objects & Reasons— Even if it is not admissible for construing the Statute, it may be considered to ascertain the conditions prevailing at the time of enactment.

The statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the history of the legislation. It is merely an expression of what according to the mover of the Bill are the scope and purpose of the legislation. But the question of severability has to be judged on the intention of the legislature as expressed in the Bill as passed, and to ascertain it the statement of the mover of the Bill is no more admissible than a speech made on the floor of the House.

Jia Lal v. Delhi Administration, 1963(1) CrLJ 1: AIR 1962 SC 1781: 1963 (2) SCR 864: 64 Pun LR 1051: 1962 All Cri R 431.

The reason for a statute is the safest guide for interpretation.

A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it.

No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed. The setting and the pattern are important. It is again important remember that Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions. Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something. Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily. Again, while the words of an enactment are important, the context is no less important. For instance, "the fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case falling literally within them should be governed by that statute, and the context of any Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning.

Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1987 SC 1454: 1987(3) SCC 279: 1987(3) SCR 317: 1987(1) Scale 1162: 1987(2) J.T. 466: 1987(64) Cut. LT 256.

Statement of object does not control the provisions of a Statute—When the language employed in the statute is clear, the Court should not engage itself to find out the supposed intention.

(Per G.B. Pattnaik, J.): If the legislature did intend that which it has expressed clearly; much more, if the legislature intended something very different; if the legislature intended pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for judges to invent something which they do not meet within the words of the text. Thus when the plain meaning of the words used in a statute indicate a particular state of affairs the Courts are not required to get themselves busy with the 'supposed intention' or with 'the policy underlying the statute' or to refer the objects and reasons which was accompanied the Bill while introducing the same on the floor of the legislation. It is only when the plain meaning of the words used in the statute creates an ambiguity then it may be permissible to have the extrinsic and of looking to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for ascertaining the true intention of the legislatures. In the aforesaid state of affairs to find out whether the impugned Act is a usurpation of judicial power by the legislature it would not be permissible to look to the Statement of Objects and Reasons which accompanied the Bill while introducing the same on the floor of the legislation nor the affidavit filed by an officer of the Government would control the true and correct meaning of the words of the statute.

S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sardana, AIR 1997 SC 3127: 1997(8) SCC 522: 1997(6) JT 637: 1997(5) Scale 90.

Statutory duty

Statutory power is not something like a statutory duty.

Before the repository of a statutory power can be made liable for negligence for a failure to exercise it, the statute must (either expressly or by implication) impose a duty to exercise the power and confer a private right of action in damages for a breach of the duty so imposed. The question whether the Act confers a private right of action depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of the Act. But by process of statutory interpretation, the courts may not superimpose a general Common Law duty on a statutory authority in order to give effect to its presumed idea of policy or duty. Common Law does not super-impose such a duty on a mere statutory authority. The nature and scope of the Common Law duty of care owed by a public authority exercising statutory powers must be discerned carefully by reading the provisions of the Act, the object it seeks to achieve and other relevant considerations.

Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997(9) SCC 552: 1997(1) JT 580: 1997(1) Scale 370

Strict Interpretation

Interpretation of a penal provision of law must be hyper-technical.

A benefit under section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be attracted only on the circumstances specifically spelt out in that provision of law, subject to the riders as added thereto in the proviso enumerated as (a), (b), (c). The benefit provided under section 138 is, therefore, a special benefit which can be attracted only on strict compliance of those requirements as specifically spelt out in the said provision of law at the point of penalty provied therein. Apart from the benefit provided in this provision of law the honest holder in appropriate case may have recourse to the other provisions of law under Indian Penal Code or Civil Laws, but in order to attract the benefit of this section he must proceed in the hyper-technical way as provided in this provision of law.

United Credit Ltd. vs. Agro Sales India, 1999 DCR 119.

Even though Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is a penal statute, it is the duty of the Court to interpret it consistent with the legislative intent and purpose so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. As stated above Section 138 of the Act has created a contractual breach as an offence and the legislative purpose is to promote efficacy of banking and of ensuring that in commercial or contractual transactions cheques are not dishonoured and credibility in transacting business through cheques is maintained. The above interpretation would be in accordance with the principle of interpretation quoted above "brush away the cobweb varnish, and who the transactions in their true light" (Wilmot C.J.) or (by Maxwell) "to carry out effectively the breach of the statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, to an indirect or circuitous manner that it has prohibited". Hence, when the cheque is returned by a bank with an endosement account closed, it would amount to returning the cheque unpaid because "the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque" as envisaged in Section 138 of the Act.

Nepc Micon Ltd. & Ors. vs. Magma Leasing Ltd., 1999 DCR 16.

Subordinate legislation

Subordinate legislation—Subordinate rules—Construction of—The rules framed by executive in exercise of its statutory powers cannot be treated as administrative directions.

Rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation. The statutory rules cannot be described as, or equated with, administrative directions.

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751: 1961(1) CrLJ 773: 1961(2) SCR 679

Framing of rules is not a condition precedent for exercise of statutory powers.

Sections 8 and 20 of the Act provided for payment of compensation to displaced persons in any of the forms as specified including by sale to the displaced persons of any property from the compensation pool and setting off the purchase money against the compensation payable to him. Sec. 16 confers power on the Central Govt. to take measures which it may consider necessary for the custody, management and disposal of the compensation pool property. The Central Govt. had therefore ample powers to take steps for disposal of pool property by auction sale and for that purpose it had authority to issue administrative directions. Sec. 40(2)(j) provides for framing of rules prescribing procedure for the transfer of property out of the compensation pool and the adjustment of the value of the property so transferred against the amount of compensation. Neither Sec. 8, 16, 20 or Sec. 40 lays down that payment of compensation by sale of the pool property to a displaced person shall not be done unless rules are framed. These provisions confer power on the Central Government and the authorities constituted under the Act power to pay compensation to displaced persons by sale, or allotment of pool property to them in accordance with rules, if any. Framing of rules regulating the mode or manner of disposal of urban agricultural property by sale to a displaced person is not a condition precedent for the exercise of power by the authorities concerned under Sections 8, 16 and 20 of the Act. If the legislative intent was that until and unless rules were framed power conferred on the authority under Sections 8, 16 and 20 could not be exercised, that intent could have been made clear by using the expression "except in accordance with the rules framed" a displaced person shall not be paid compensation by sale of pool property. In the absence of any such provision the framing of rules could not be a condition precedent for the exercise of power.

Surinder Singh v. Central Government, AIR 1986 SC 2166: 1986(4) SCC 667: 1986 JT 578: 1986(3) SCR 946: 1986(2) Scale 550.

Harmonious construction—Rules being legislative in character must be harmoniously construed to avoid absurd results.

Since the rules legislative in character, they must harmoniously be interpreted as a connected whole giving life and force to each word, phrase and rule and no part thereof should be rendered nugatory or a surplusage. Resort to iron out the creases could be had only when the construction of the relevant rule, phrase or word would lead to unintended absurd results.

Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 284: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272: 1990 Supp (2) SCR 573: 1990 (2) Scale 951.

Necessity to avoid strict Insistence on judicial procedure in the rules to ensure legislative intent.

Where the trellis work of technical procedures and rules of evidence usually applicable to ordinary courts under the Code contains too many taboos regarding pleadings and too many prescriptions regarding trials, administrative bodies, manned by lay and legal men, charged with duties which are wider than decision of individual disputes between specific parties and operating quasi-judicially at the public-interest level, have to enjoy more liberal powers and less formal and more flexible processes if they are to fulfil the statutory behest efficaciously. To over-judicialize is to undermine. In the construction of statutes establishing administrative agencies and defining their powers, there is little scope for the deep-rooted shibboleth that into the statute must be read, by lawyer's instinct, the requirements of the trial of a civil suit or the hearing of an appeal by the ordinary courts of the land. This may result in defeating their obvious purpose. We will therefore briefly examine the legislative goal of the statute under construction, the general policy of the legislature in enacting the relevant sections and the definition of the sources from which information or evidence may be sought by the tribunals working within the framework of the Act.

B. Prabhakara Rao v. Desari Panakala Rao, AIR 1976 SC 1803: 1976(3) SCC 550: 1976(3) SCR 1032.

Supplying deficiency

Duty of court while applying outdated legislation.

So, within the existing, dated legislation, new meanings must be read. Of course, new legislation is the best solution, but when lawmakers take far too long for social patience to suffer, as in this very case of prison reform, courts have to make-do with interpretation and carve on wood and sculpt on stone ready at hand and not wait for far away marble architecture. Counsel rivetted their attention on this pragmatic engineering and jointly helped the court to constitutionalise the Prisons Act prescriptions. By this legal energetic they desired the court to read into vintage provisions legal remedies.

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579: 1980(3) SCC 488: 1980(2) SCR 557

Temporary statute

If an Act contains a proviso that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, it is called a Temporary Act. This result would follow not only from the terms of the Act itself but also from the fact that it was intended only as a temporary measure. This ratio has also been applied to emergency measures which continue during the subsistence of the emergency but lapse with the cessation thereof.

Hansraj Moolji v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 497: 1957 CrLJ 599: 1957 SCR 634: 59 Bom LR 910: 1957 All WR (HC) .

Temporary Statute— Period of operation— Ordinarily proceedings under a temporary Statute comes to an end as soon as Statute expires unless a special provision to the contrary provided in the Statute.

The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires.

S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, 1951 AIR SC 301: 1951 CrLJ 1103: 1951 SCR 621: 1951(2) Mad LJ 105.

Vague or uncertain statute

Application of principles of harmonious construction— Vague or uncertain provision cannot be struck down on this ground alone in the absence of any violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution.

A statute enacted by a Legislature falling within its competence which did not offend any fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and which did not contravene any other provision of the Constitution could not be declared ultra vires either on the ground that its provisions were vague, or uncertain or ambiguous or mutually inconsistent.

Unlike the American Constitution, there was no 'due process' clause in our Constitution and, therefore, Indian Courts could not declare a statute invalid on the ground that it contained vague, uncertain, ambiguous or mutually inconsistent provisions, and that it was the duty and function of the Indian Court, in relation to each forensic situation, to examine the language of the law, the context in which it was made, to discover the intention of the Legislature and to interpret the law to make effective and not to frustrate the legislative intent and in that behalf it could always call in aid well-known canons of interpretation and even where the provisions of a statute appeared to by mutually inconsistent there were several well-known rules of interpretation to guide the Court in giving a proper meaning to the provisions of a statute, such as, the rule of harmonious construction, the rule that special shall prevail over the general, etc.

Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 2097: 1980 Supp. SCC 574: 1980(3) SCR 1181: 1980 Pun LJ 470.

Rule of construction—Necessity to make attempt to arrive at a construction in accordance with legislative intent.

The real rule is that if a law is vague or appears to be so, the Court must by to construe it, as far, as may be, and language permiting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where however the law admits of no such construction and the persons applying it are in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie takes away a guaranteed freedom, the law must be held to offend the Constitution as was done in the case of the Goonda Act.

K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 481: 1970(2) SCC 780: 1971(2) SCJ 242: 1971(2) SCR 446.

The construction which renders the Statute to a futility should be avoided— It is duty of Court to interpret the Statute to make it workable.

The Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a Statute to a futility. The provision of a Statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle "ut res majis valeat quam periapt". It is, no doubt, true that if a Statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the Statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial-review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Art. 14; but what a Court of construction, dealing with the language of a Statute, does in under to ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it.

It is, therefore the court's duty to make what it can of the Statute, knowing that the Statute are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a Court to declare a Statute unworkable.

Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123: 1989(3) SCC 709: 01989(2) SCR 544: 1989 (1) Scale 1006: 1989 (2) JT 217.

Validation statute

Retrospective enactment of statute to remove the basis of decision of the Court— It does not nullify the verdict but merely removes the lacunae.

This Court had not invalidated any provisions of the recruitment rules but merely interpreted some provisions of the Rules for determining the inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the promotees. The Act passed by the legislatures, therefore, is not a validation Act but merely an Act passed by the State Legislature giving it retrospective effect from the date the State of Haryana came into existence and consequently from the date the service in question came into existence. The power of the legislature under Article 246(3) of the Constitution to make law for the State with respect to the matters enumerated in List II of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution is wide enough to make law determining the service conditions of the employees of the State. In the case in hand there has been no challenge to the legislative competence of the State legislature to enact the legislation in question and in our view rightly, nor there has been any challenge on the ground of contravention of Part III of the Constitution. Under the constitutional scheme the power of the legislature to make law is paramount subject to the field of legislation as enumerated in the Entries in different Lists. The function of the judiciary is to interpret the law and to adjudicate the rights of the parties in accordance with law made by the legislature. When a particular Rule or the Act is interpreted by a Court of law in a specified manner and the law making authority forms the opinion that such an interpretation would adversely affect the rights of the parties and would be grossly inequitous and accordingly a new set of rule or law is enacted, it is very often challenged as in the present case on the ground that the legislatures have usurped the judicial power. In such a case the Court has a delicate function to examine the new set of laws enacted by the legislatures and to find out whether in fact the legislature have exercised the legislative power by merely declaring an earlier judicial decision to be invalid and ineffective of the legislatures have altered and changed the character of the legislation which ultimately may render the judicial decision ineffective. It cannot be disputed that the legislatures can always render a judicial decisions ineffective by enacting valid law on the topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively

What is really prohibited is that legislature cannot in exercise of its plenary power under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution merely declare a decision of a Court of Law to be invalid or to be inoperative in which case it would be held to be an exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly under the scheme of Constitution the legislature do not possess the same. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles it is necessary to examine the legality of the Act in question. If we do not examine the substantive provisions of the Act and merely go by the object and reasons as given for the enactment of the Act as well as the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State then the Act would be possibly held to be an intrusion to the judicial sphere by the legislature.

S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sardana, AIR 1997 SC 3127: 1997(8) SCC 522: 1997(6) JT 637: 1997(5) Scale 90.

War-time legislation

War‑time measures, which often have to be enacted hastily to meet a grave pressing national emergency in which the very existence of the State is at stake, should be construed more liberally in favour of the Crown or the State than peace‑time legislation.

State of Bombay v. Virkumar Gulabchand Shah,AIR 1952 SC 335: 1952 CrLJ 1406: 1952 SCR 877: 1952 All WR Supp 99.

Welfare legislation

Interpretation of—While interpreting the provisions of the Act Court should keep in mind the constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act.

The thrust of Article 17 and the Act is to liberate the society from blind and ritualistic adherence and traditional beliefs which lost all legal or moral base. It seeks to establish new ideal for society—equality to the Dalits, at par with general public, absence of disabilities, restrictions or prohibitions on grounds of caste or religion, availability of opportunities and a sense of being a participant in the main stream of national life. In interpreting the Act, the judge should be cognizant to and always keep at the back of his/her mind the constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisons of the Act in the light thus shed to annihilate untouchability; to accord to the Dalits and the Tribes right to equality, social intergration a fruition and fraternity a reality.

State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, 1993 CrLJ 1029: AIR 1993 SC 1126: 1993 CrLR (SC) 72: 1992 (3) Crimes 1104.

Socially benevolent legislation — Construction of provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 — The construction beneficial to the subject should be preferred.

The intention of the legislature which is conferring larger benefit to the claimant. Interpretation of such beneficial legislation is also well settled. Whenever there be two possible interpretations in such statute then the one which subserves the object of legislation, viz., benefit to the subject should be accepted.

The amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act, he receives without any contribution. As we have said the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.

Helen C. Rebello vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, 1999 (1) ACJ 10: 1999 (1) SCC 90: AIR 1998 SC 3191.

A welfare legislation enacted for the benefit of the poor workmen should receive liberal interpretation — If any provision is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation which is more favourable to the person for whose benefit the legislature in its wisdom has legislated, should be adopted.

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajoy Medhi, 1996(2) ACJ 727 Gau. and Lipton India Ltd. v. Bakul Ch. Mandal, 1981 Lab I. Cases 1309.;

Construction furthering the policy of Statute should be preferred.

In construing the provisions of a welfare legislation courts should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction; but, apart from this general consideration about the policy and object of the Act.

Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd., v. Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 647: 1961(2) SCJ 745: 1961(3) SCR 297.

Necessity to further policy and object of statute—Interpretation in favour of beneficiaries of legislation, should be preferred.

In construing the provision of a welfare legislation, courts should adopt, what is described as a beneficent rule of construction. If the constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the section, it follows that the construction which furthers the policy and object of the Act and is more beneficial to the employees, has to be preferred. Another principle to be borne in mind is that the Act in question which intends to improve and safeguard the service conditions of an employee, demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose. But we should not also lose sight of another canon of interpretation that a statute or for the matter of that even a particular section, has to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to the language used by the legislature.

Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India v. Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227: 1973 (1) SCC 813: 1973(3) SCR 587.

Principle of construction of welfare legislation— Need for protection for weaker sections of society, even from departing from dictionary meaning of the word, emphasised.

Statutory construction, when courts consider welfare legislation with an economic justice bias, cannot turn on cold print glorified as grammatical construction but on teleological purpose and protective intendment.

While canons of traditional sanctity cannot wholly govern, courts cannot go haywire in interpreting provisions, ignoring the text and context.

But dictionaries are not dictators or statutory construction where the benignant mood of a law and, more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation.

State Bank of India v. Shri N. Sundara Money, AIR 1976 SC 1111: 1976(1) SCC 822: 1976(3) SCR 160.

The settled principles required to be kept in view while interpreting the statutory provisions enacted for the protection of public at large and not only the individuals alone, thus are:

(i) the circumstances in which statutory Act was passed;

(ii) the situation the Act was required to meet;

(iii) the object of the common law is to solve the difficulties arising in social or commercial life. It must meet, so far as possible, the set of facts, abnormal as well as usual. It must grow with the development of a nation, must face and deal with the changing moral circumstances. Unless it can do that, it fails in its functions and declines in its dignity and value in the expanding society's demands from the common law. Reference may be made to 1935 (1) KB 70, 1924 (1) KB 57, 1948 (2) KB 23, and 1927 (2) KB 254;

(iv) the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the particular Act under consideration. Whether a particular rule applied in a particular case depends upon the purview of legislation and the language employed;

(v) it is the pith and substance of the legislation which has to be taken into consideration and not the isolated words, bereft of context and the text in which they are used, with reference to the object of the same, the object of provisions, malice intended to be remedied and edifice of the provisions contained in the Act;

(vi) the words used in the Act are not to be applied literally. The facts cannot be sacrificed to phrases invalidating a situation;

(vii) no interpretation can be put which turns out to be so unfair that words used by the legislation could not have ben intended to mean what they might appear to say;

(viii) by interpretation process, unfair or draconian result should not be produced;

(ix) while resorting to interpretation of statute, what a reasonable person would think of a statute to mean and follow them, cannot be lost sight of;

(x) while interpreting the law enacted for public at large involving social justice and social security, sacred approach to say 'yes' unless there are good reasons to say 'no' would be more appropriate as it would affirm public faith in the institution like insurance more than to shake it;

(xi) an attempt should be made while interpreting the statutory provisions is not rendered otiose by its literal construction/interpretation;

(xii) the individual needs and demands of society, how far the legislature has gone to reconcile between the need of the society and the claim of individual, readjustment of old principles with new needs of the situation, standard forms, customs, and other circumstances taking the matter to be different when law is unwillingly broken, astute enough to have contrived to get it how it contributes to public morality with emphasis on equity. Principles should be required to be invoked more liberally when public interest demands the same;

(xiii) in the social welfare legislation's interpretation, benefits to the claimants should be given preference over the technicalities of law which should not be allowed to have upper hand to undo and crush the legislation;

(xiv) it is desirable that while interpreting a statute a sympathetic view to relieve the duress and misery of the victims should be preferred;

(xv) the doctrine of necessities keeping in view the duty of the State to rule justice has to be enforced and given full effect through process of judicial enforcement. Strict test propounded from time to time for interpretation cannot prevail to perpetuate injustice. Test would not be applied to avoid justice;

(xvi) in order to give effect to the predominant purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act providing preventive measures as well as remedial ones after the even, ensuring the safety of third person, principle of liberal construction as presently the trend is, to give effect to protection of third party without adopting the disective course or defences taken by insurer under statute, is to be made. It would only give effect to public policy on ground realities,

(xvii) ordinarily, in case of social welfare legislation, endeavour is to be made to put interpretation beneficial to the claimant. Technicalities of law should not be allowed to have upper hand to undo and crush the spirit of legislation for social justice, which is not negotiable at all.

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Santro Devi, 1997 ACJ 111 P&H.

Social settings—Consideration of—Construction of Rent Control Legislation—Interpretation protecting the poor should been favoured.

Statutory construction, so long as law is at the service of life, cannot be divorced from the social setting. That is why, welfare legislation like the one with which we are now concerned, must be interpreted in a Third World perspective. We are not on the Fifth Avenue or West End of London. We are in a hilly region of an Indian town with indigents struggling to live and huddling for want of accommodation. The law itself is intended to protect tenants from unreasonable eviction and is, therefore, loaded a little in favour of that class of beneficiaries. When interpreting the text of such provisions—and this holds good in reading the meaning of documents regulating the relations between the weaker and the stronger contracting parties—we must recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him.

Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal, AIR 1978 SC 1601: 1979(2) SCC 274: 1979(1) SCR 900.

In a welfare State which is being progressively industrialised measure like the Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed in a more liberal sense in favour of the workmen so that deserving workmen get full and speedy benefit and advantage of these beneficent measures. Such liberal interpretation would accomplish the humane and beneficial purposes of this legislation, the provisions of which are truly responsive to the social economic needs which have been recognised by our society and by our Constitution. The rights of workmen deserve to be generously treated while applying the statutory provisions because the procedure under this law provides a speedier, simpler, cheaper and more efficient machinery for the determination and payment of compensation to the workmen. Judicial and quasi-judicial officers should, therefore, not treat matters of procedure so rigidly as to deprive the citizens of the advantages and benefits of this beneficial legislation on technical grounds, it is of the utmost importance that no construction of the provisions relating to procedure should sacrifice the rights of the poor workmen due to technical mistake, omissions or inaccuracies.

Sarup Singh vs. Mukim Lal, AIR 1960 Punjab 119.

Statutes framed with a social purpose must be interpreted in consonance with legislative purpose to further it object.

The right of the landholders to keep his private land to himself has therefore to be interpreted in its proper perspective. Statuta pro publico late interpretatur. Statute made for the public good ought to be liberally construed. The concept of past or present intention of the landholder to resume personal cultivation of land let out to a tenant and still in possession of the tenant has to be strictly construed against the landlord and liberally in favour of the tenant.

Interpretation of the words 'private land' and 'ryoti land' has to be made in consonance with the legislative purpose, provisions and scheme of the enactment. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus. To interpret and in such a way as to harmonise laws with laws is the best mode of interpretation.

Pollisetti Pullamma v. Kalluri Kameswaramma, AIR 1991 SC 604: 1990 Supp (2) SCR 393: 1990 (4) JT 293: 1990 (2) Scale 883.

Broad interpretation—Necessity of.

Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter' statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, recieve a broad interpretation. Where legistation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions.

Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, AIR 1981 SC 422: 1980(4) SCC 443: 1981(1) SCR 789: 1981 BBCJ (SC) 6.