The High Court may exercise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers of appeal and revision conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) on a High Court as if the court of the special Judge were a court of Session trying cases within the local limits of the High Court. (Section 27 of PC Act)
However a conviction resulted from summary trial is not amenable to challenge in appeal.
Appellate Jurisdiction
The appellate court has a duty to make a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all vital features of the case. The evidence brought on record in entirety has to be scrutinized with care and caution. It is the duty of the Judge to see that justice is appropriately administered, for that is the paramount consideration of a Judge. The said responsibility cannot be abdicated or abandoned or ostracised, even remotely, solely because there might not have been proper assistance by the counsel appearing for the parties. The appellate court is required to weigh the materials, ascribe concrete reasons and the filament of reasoning must logically flow from the requisite analysis of the material on record. The approach cannot be cryptic. It cannot be perverse. The duty of the Judge is to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately. The reasoning in appeal are to be well deliberated. They are to be resolutely expressed. An objective judgment of the evidence reflects the greatness of mind – sans passion and sans prejudice. The reflective attitude of the Judge must be demonstrable from the judgment itself. A judge must avoid all kind of weakness and vacillation. That is the sole test. That is the litmus test.
K. Anbazhagan vs State of Karnataka, decided by SC on 27 April, 2015.
Interlocutory orders
Section 19(3)(c) expressly prohibits any stay of proceedings under the Act. It provides:
"No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings."
Order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not tore-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period.
Asian Resurfacing Of Road Agency vs Central Bureau Of Investigation decided by SC on 28 March, 2018.
Failure of justice
If the failure of justice is not bestowed its due signification in a case of the present nature, every procedural lapse or interdict would be given a privileged place on the pulpit. It would, with unnecessary interpretative dynamism, have the effect potentiality to cause a dent in the criminal justice delivery system and eventually, justice would become illusory like a mirage. It is to be borne in mind that the legislature deliberately obliterated certain rights conferred on the accused at the committal stage under the new Code. The intendment of the legislature in the plainest sense is that every stage is not to be treated as vital and it is to be interpreted to subserve the substantive objects of the criminal trial.
Rattiram v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 516.
An allegation of 'failure of justice' is a very strong allegation and use of an equally strong expression and cannot be equated with a miscarriage of justice or a violation of law or an irregularity in procedure – it is much more. If the expression is to be understood as in common parlance, the result would be that seldom would a trial reach a conclusion since an irregularity could take place at any stage, inadmissible evidence could be erroneously admitted, an adjournment wrongly declined etc. To conclude, therefore, Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act must be given a very restricted interpretation.
Girish Kumar Suneja vs CBI decided by SC on 13 July, 2017.
In the event of a failure of justice, a de novo trial could be ordered but that should be the last resort and only when such a course becomes desperately indispensable. If the "core" of the case is not affected but there are some procedural illegalities that would not be a good ground for ordering a de novo trial. This is because the appellate court has plenary powers for revaluating and reappraising the evidence and even to take additional evidence by the appellate court itself or to direct such additional evidence to be collected by the trial court.
State of M.P. v. Bhooraji, (2001) 7 SCC 679.
Revision
The revisional powers of the High Court, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate Criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers vested in them by the Code. When the remedy of revision is considered as not a right of an accused, at all, the absence of the remedy of revision cannot be considered as deprivation of a right.
Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 144.
Framing of charge is not a stage, at which final test of guilt is to be applied. Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge, the court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold something which is neither permissible nor is in consonance with scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure. Now, reverting to the limit of the scope of jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr. P.C., which vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.
State of Rajasthan vs Fatehkaran Mehdu decided by SC on 3 February, 2017.
These are some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
4. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
5. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
Amit Kapoor and Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
Delay in Revision
A complainant at whose instance a criminal case is registered against a person, can prefer a revision petition against the acquittal of the accused in case the State does not prefer any appeal against such acquittal. Since no such appeal has been preferred by the State, therefore, the appellant/petitioner has the locus standi to prefer a revision petition and to make an application for condonation of delay which has occurred in filing the present revision petition. However, what is to be seen is whether for condonation of delay sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant/petitioner or not?
Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within certain limit. Length of delay is not the deciding factor but acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. In every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. The words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.
No doubt, he has moved the present application and the revision petition only on coming to know that a suit against him has been instituted by the respondent for compensation for malicious prosecution, however, the summons issued in the same suit brought it to the knowledge of the applicant/petitioner that the respondent has been acquitted in the case wherein he was the informant and, therefore, his taking steps to file the revision petition cannot be said to be counter-blast and thus a mala fide act on his part.
Thus, once the sufficient cause explaining the delay is shown and negligence inaction or want of bona fide cannot be attributed to the petitioner, irrespective of the period, the delay has to be condoned. In the case in hand, as already observed, sufficient cause for delay in filing the revision petition has been shown by the applicant/petitioner, therefore, this application deserves to be allowed and the delay in filing the petition is liable to be condoned.
Vimal Kishore vs. D.D.Gautam, 2001(1) Crimes 159 (HP).
Suspension of Sentence
When the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal.
K.C. Sareen vs. C.B.I. Chandigarh, (2001) 6 SCC 584.
Appellate Court while exercising power under Section 389 Cr.P.C. can suspend the sentence of imprisonment as well as of fine without any condition or with conditions. There are no fetters on the power of the Appellate Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 389 Cr.P.C.. The Appellate Court could have suspended the sentence and fine both or could have directed for deposit of fine or part of fine.
Satyendra Kumar Mehra @ Satendera vs State Of Jharkhand decided by SC on 23 March, 2018.
Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance.
K.C. Sareen vs C.B.I., Chandigarh, [2001] 6 SCC 584 followed in Ravi Kant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali JT 2006 (1) SC 578.
In appropriate cases the conviction and sentences can be suspended in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C as well. However the stay on conviction can have serious consequences and must not be readily granted by court without assigning reasons thereof.
Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang, followed in State Of Tamil Nadu vs A. Jaganathan, JT 1996 (6), 621 1996 SCALE (5)382.
Whether failure to stay the conviction will lead to injustice and irreversible consequences is a question to be determined on the particular facts of the case.
Daya Shanker Rai And Anr. vs State Of U.P. decided by HC of Allahabad on 29 November, 2007.
When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level.
K.C. Sareen vs C.B.I., Chandigarh decided by SC on 2 August, 2001.
Appeal to Supreme Court
If the view taken by the High Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court appears to be just and reasonable and which is supported by cogent reasoning then Supreme Court would not re-appreciate the evidence again especially when the appeal arises out of the order of acquittal.It is only when the High Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court fails to record any reason or fails to appreciate the evidence or when the High Court records any material finding which is wholly perverse or against any provision of law, Supreme Court would examine the issues arising in the case and in appropriate case may interfere.
State Of Kerala vs P. Muhammed Noushad decided by SC on 29 June, 2016.
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